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DANIEL E. MURRAY* "
The author surveys and discusses recent decisions and leg-
islation touching on all aspects of commercial practice in Flor-
ida. The survey covers such topics as the sale of goods, bulk
sales, products liability, real property sales, shipping and
warehousing, negotiable instruments, sureties and guarantors,
mortgages, banks and banking, consumer protection, and secur-
ity interests.
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COMMERCIAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey reviews and selectively criticizes all Florida cases
and legislation arising under the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) and in areas outside of the U.C.C. but within commercial
law practice.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. Venue
Two recent cases leave Florida's venue rules untouched. In
Speedling, Inc. v. Krig,' the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that venue was proper in Hillsborough County because
the seller's business was located there and the seller had failed to
perform there. In that case, there was no basis for the buyer's
claim that venue should have been in the county of his residence.
Then, in a case decided in 1980 in which the contract was silent on
where the buyer should make payment, an appellate court refused
to upset the seller's choice of county for venue purposes in the ab-
sence of an express provision that the buyer should have made
payment in another county.2
B. Remedies
Buyers in Florida must meet certain prerequisites of reasona-
ble notification for inspection of defective goods8 and timely notifi-
cation of breach4 to have a remedy for breach of contract. In a
recent case on this point, a grocery retailer destroyed defective
canned goods, gave notice of the defect to the seller, and then sued
the seller for breach of warranty.8 The court barred the retailer's
suit because he had given the seller no opportunity to inspect or
test the destroyed goods; the court gave no weight to an out-of-
state agency's finding that the goods were defective.
Another recent case held that to have a valid suit for overpay-
ment, a debtor in Florida must seasonably object to an incorrect
billing for goods purchased. Five years after the purchase is not a
reasonable time within which to object.
1. 378 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
2. Sheffield Steel Prods., Inc. v. Powell Bros., 385 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
3. FLA. STAT. § 672.515(1) (1979).
4. Id. § 672.607(3)(a) (1979).
5. General Matters, Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980).
6. Dudas v. Dade County, 385 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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C. Parol Evidence Rule
Although the parol evidence rule prevents parol testimony to
vary, modify, or contradict a valid written contract, the parol evi-
dence rule should not bar oral testimony on the terms of an alleged
contract, if the issue in a case is whether or not there is in fact a
contract.
D. Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business
The purpose of section 2-403 of the U.C.C. is to protect sales
to buyers in the ordinary course of business. 8 The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, gave a most liberal, but erroneous, inter-
pretation to this section in a case decided in 1979. In Carlsen v.
Rivera,9 a Canadian auto leasing company leased one of its cars in
Canada to a local car dealer, McEnroe. The lease was made out in
the car dealer's individual name, and it included his home address
rather than his business address. The car dealer obtained a fraudu-
lent paper title to the car and then sold it to a rental agency, Expo,
in Florida. Expo sold the car to a car dealer, Marlin Imports, which
sold it to an individual purchaser, Carlsen, in Florida. The appel-
late court held that the lessor had entrusted the lessee, McEnroe,
with possession of the car and that despite the form of the lease,
the lessee was a merchant who dealt in goods of the kind. Thus far,
the court's analysis was correct. But then the court got lost in its
own rhetoric:
Should the result be any different because of the existence
of intervening sales? We think not. Carlsen purchased the auto-
mobile from Marlin Imports, Inc., which was engaged in the bus-
iness of selling automobiles. Carlsen had no notice of any defect
in the title and in fact obtained a title certificate. Under these
circumstances, Carlsen was clearly a buyer in the ordinary
course of business. In pre-Code language, McEnroe conveyed
voidable title to Expo, who conveyed voidable title to Marlin,
who conveyed voidable title to Carlsen, a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice. The Uniform Commercial Code does not
change the result. The buyer in the ordinary course of business
obtains good title by virtue of Subsection 2 of Section 672.403,
Florida Statutes (1977).10
7. Deal Farms, Inc. v. Farms & Ranch Supply, Inc., 382 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
8. FLA. STAT. § 672.403 (1979).
9. 382 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
10. Id. at 827.
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The court is quite wrong about pre-Code law. There could
have been a string of 1,000 bona fide purchasers ending with the
ultimate buyer and he would not have acquired good title. Under
pre-Code law, a voidable title could not ripen into a good title
merely as a result of a transfer to a bona fide purchaser. Secondly,
the court is wrong in its assumption that for good title to pass to
Carlsen, the car dealer (Marlin) had to be a merchant, and the ul-
timate buyer (Carlsen) had to be a buyer in the ordinary course.
Section 2-403 deals with a buyer who buys, in the ordinary course
of business from a merchant, goods entrusted to that merchant by
the owner. In this case, the owner did not entrust Marlin with the
car; hence, section 2-403 had no direct application to the Marlin-
Carlsen transaction. The correct analysis is that the ultimate buyer
got perfect title because the entrustee (McEnroe) gave perfect title
to the car rental agency (Expo), if the agency acted in good faith
and purchased the car for value. Expo passed perfect title to Mar-
lin, which then conveyed perfect title to Carlsen, the ultimate
buyer. Thus, the court arrived at the right result in spite of its
incorrect analysis of section 2-403 and the facts of the case.
E. De Facto Corporate Sellers and Buyers
De facto status does not shield corporate sellers and buyers
from personal liability when there is fraud or intentional misuse of
corporate status in a transaction. A case in point is Nessim v.
DeLoache." In that case, the state dissolved a seller-corporation
for nonpayment of its delinquent taxes. This involuntary dissolu-
tion occurred before the closing of a sale of goods. Although the
corporation regained legal status after the sale, the court held the
president and sole stockholder of the corporation personally liable
under section 607.271(5) of the Florida Statutes (1979) for any al-
leged fraudulent representations about the quality of the goods
sold. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the corporate seller
could not avoid liability by hiring a broker who allegedly misrepre-
sented the quality of the goods, even if the seller did not authorize
or know about the misrepresentations.
Another case took a similar approach in holding the president
of a firm personally liable for the price of goods purchased in the
corporate name. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Thoss,'2 the state had dis-
solved the corporation by the time of purchase, but later reinstated
11. 384 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
12. 385 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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it. The court stressed that its interpretation of section 607.397 of
the Florida Statutes (1979) imposed liability only on officers who
apparently acted for the corporation and who should have known
of the corporation's dissolution. The court rejected the reasoning
of Futch v. Southern Stores, Inc.,1" which had held that officers
are not personally liable unless the person dealing with the corpo-
ration demonstrates his reliance on the personal assets of the
officers.
F. Damages
The general measure of damages for breach of warranty under
section 2-714 of the U.C.C.14 is the difference at the time of accept-
ance between "the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted."15
In Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. v. Redmond, 6 an appellate
court applied this section of the Code to a breach of warranty of
title. From the incomplete statement of facts in the case, it appears
that a purported salesman of a car dealer sold one of the dealer's
cars for $1,000 less than its marked price. The buyer gave the
"salesman" a $1,000 cash deposit and the balance of $5,200 when
the "salesman" delivered the car. One month later, when the buyer
asked for his car title, the dealer's employees informed him that he
should consult the dealer's insurance company, since they had ear-
lier reported the car stolen. The buyer could not obtain proper ti-
tle and registration, so he sued the dealer for breach of warranty of
title under section 2-312 of the U.C.C.1 7 At trial, the buyer failed to
show the difference between the value of the car as accepted and
the value it would have had as warranted, the measure of damages
under section 2-714(2) of the U.C.C.' 8 But he did testify about
monetary loss resulting from his inability to drive an unregistered
car and his unsuccessful attempts to get a title certificate. The jury
awarded him $2,500 compensatory and $7,000 punitive damages.
The appellate court properly reversed the punitive damage award
because this case was a simple breach of warranty, unaccompanied
by any tort. The result of the appellate decision was that the buyer
received $2,500 instead of the $6,200 he paid for the car. If there
13. 380 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 19t DCA 1979).
14. FLA. STAT. § 672.714 (1979).
15. Id. § 672.714(2).
16. 378 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
17. FLA. STAT. § 672.312 (1979).
18. Id. § 672.714(2).
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was indeed a total breach of'warranty of title, the difference be-
tween the value of the car as accepted and the value it would have
had with proper title should have been the total amount paid, be-
cause a car that cannot be registered has a zero value. Thus the
trial court should have awarded $6,200.
In a case decided in 1979, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, properly awarded damages for lost profits to an aggrieved
buyer for a seller's failure to deliver units specified by the contract,
but rested its decision only on a case involving no sale of goods and
on Florida Jurisprudence.19 The court seemed unaware that the
Florida Statutes (the U.C.C.) covered this issue. Damages for lost
profits are within the scope of section 2-713(1) of the U.C.C.,20
which provides that when the seller is in breach the measure of
damages is the difference between the market price at the time the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price, together with
any incidental and consequential damages.
An appellate court took an interesting approach to the mea-
surement of damages under section 2-714 of the U.C.C.2 1 in Adam
Metal Supply, Inc. v. Electrodex, Inc.2 2 A contract called for ship-
ment of a particular kind of aluminum sheeting; the buyer discov-
ered after shearing the aluminum that it was not the kind specified
in the contract. The buyer promptly notified the seller of the im-
proper aluminum and, in the meantime, used forty percent of it to
manufacture goods. The purchaser of the finished goods then re-
fused to take any more goods manufactured with this aluminum.
The seller sued the buyer for the price. The trial court allowed the
seller to retrieve the unused aluminum (sixty percent) and denied
any other relief because it concluded that the buyer was entitled to
a setoff of the full amount of the price of the aluminum. The ap-
pellate court reversed, holding that while the seller was entitled to
its price, the buyer was entitled only to damages for breach of war-
ranty measured by the difference between the value of the alumi-
num as accepted and its value as warranted. The buyer had ac-
cepted and used forty percent of the aluminum but failed to show
that its value was less than the contract price. Therefore, the ap-
19. Shidiam Corp. v. M & D Research Corp., 374 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
20. FLA. STAT. § 672.713(1) (1979).
21. Id. § 672.714.
22. 386 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See Mikanto Constr. Corp. v. Dade County,
379 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (when the unrebutted evidence shows that a buyer has
paid a certain portion of the sales price it is reversible error for the trial court to fail to set
off this sum against the total sales price).
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pellate court allowed the buyer a setoff of sixty percent against the
seller's right to the sales price. In addition, because the buyer
proved that it had incurred shearing costs of $200 before it discov-
ered the seller's breach, the appellate court awarded the buyer a
setoff of sixty percent of the shearing costs as incidental damages.
The case of Tuttle/White Constructors, Inc. v. Montgomery
Elevator Co.28 evidences the willingness of Florida courts to permit
setoff claims against potential damage awards. In that case, a sub-
contractor sued a contractor who pleaded an affirmative defense of
setoff for the subcontractor's delay in installing an elevator. The
District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, allowed the setoff claim
even though other subcontractors may have contributed to the de-
lay and the general contractor could not show the proportionate
liabilities of the subcontractors.
G. Punitive Damages
Generally, punitive damages are not appropriate in an action
for breach of contract unless the breach also constitutes a tort."
Even then, the defendant must have committed the tort with
"malice, moral turpitude, wantonness or outrageousness.' 5
Pleading indicia of breach alone is insufficient to warrant an
award of punitive damages. In Overseas Equipment Co. v. Aceros
Arquitectonicos,26 the buyer failed to establish an action in tort for
conversion, even though the buyer alleged the seller's refusal to de-
liver all the goods under a contract, the seller's partial delivery of
nonconforming goods, and the seller's refusal to return any part of
the purchase price. With no compensatory award for tort, the court
held there could be no punitive damages at all.
The case of Hauser Motor Co. v. Byrd27 reiterates the rule
that a compensatory award is necessary to support a punitive
award. The undisputed facts showed that a car dealer had set back
the odometer of a used car. In the buyer's action against the dealer
under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,28 the
jury awarded punitive damages without a compensatory award.
The trial court granted a new trial and the appellate court affirmed
that decision, even though the trial court had not articulated rea-
23. 385 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
24. Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957).
25. Greer v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
26. 374 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
27. 377 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
28. FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (1979).
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sons for the new trial.
When a breach of contract involves an intentional and fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, however, punitive damages are appropriate.
For example, in a 1979 case, the facts indicated that the buyer
never intended to pay for the goods, and that he intended to resist
payment "on spurious grounds."' 9 The court ruled that the seller
was entitled to both compensatory and punitive damages.
In another case, a jury awarded punitive damages under a
count in quasi-contract for restitution as well as under a count in
tort for fraudulent misrepresentation. 0 Because the sellers had in-
tentionally and fraudulently misrepresented the weight of several
loads of corn, the buyers had paid more than called for by the con-
tract. This case has dubious precedential value, because the losing
party failed to object to the jury instructions on punitive damages,
and the judge submitted to the jury a general rather than a special
verdict.
H. Tort Liability
In four recent decisions, the Florida courts dealt with the rela-
tionship between tortious conduct and the enforceability of con-
tracts. In Bill Terry's Inc. v. Westside Auto Radio, Inc.,"1 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, held that an alleged buyer of
goods was liable for the purchase price of goods he had never or-
dered. Thieves had stolen the buyer's purchase orders and the
buyer, who knew of the theft, did not inform the seller. In the past,
the buyer had not required verification of the propriety of his
purchase orders. In this case, the negligence of the alleged buyer
was the direct cause of the seller's loss.
Another case touching on causation concluded that if direct
interference with a contract is the cause of a contracting party's
loss, that party may sue for tortious interference even though the
contractual obligation is totally unenforceable.32 Then, in Ethyl
Corp. v. Baiter,88 an appellate court outlined the parameters of a
29. Gottsch v. Walker, 376 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
30. Johnson v. Lasher Milling Co., 379 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
31. 376 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
32. United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1979).
33. Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1223-25 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In a companion
case, the Third District held that an attorney involved in contract negotiations might have
tortiously interfered with the withdrawal of one of the parties. Even if the contract in ques-
tion was not legally enforceable, the parties would have honored their obligations if the
attorney had not interfered. Scussel v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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suit for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. A
court cannot sustain a jury's finding of a tortious interference with
a contractual relationship when the facts show that: (a) there was a
total lack of direct interference between the defendant and the
contracting parties; (b) the defendant's alleged interference did not
invade any individual rights of the contracting parties; (c) the de-
fendant was, in effect, a beneficiary of the contract; (d) the defen-
dant was privileged to act the way it did to safeguard its own
financial interests; and (e) despite any alleged illegality of the de-
fendant's acts, the plaintiff based his interference claim merely on
the malice or ill-will of the defendant's employees toward him.
A contract based on fraud and deceit is unenforceable and
rescindable. Another recent Third District case points out that
when a contracting party brings suit for damages instead of for
rescission, the parties' expectation that the contract is enforceable
warrants its total enforcement. 4 In that case, the plaintiffs sued
for breach of a contract that provided for arbitration under Florida
law. The court compelled enforcement of the arbitration clause be-
cause by suing for damages, the plaintiffs had affirmed all the
terms of the contract.
I. Exculpatory Clauses
In upholding a wordy exculpatory clause, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, recently demonstrated the benefits of pre-
cision in contract draftsmanship.30 The clause at issue exculpated a
burglar alarm company for any loss arising out of its negligence in
installing and operating the system. The court found a clear inten-
tion to exonerate the company from its own negligence. The deci-
sion is correct so long as it is confined to the negligence counts of
the complaint. Since the complaint also alleged breaches of implied
34. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
35. L. Luria & Son, Inc. ex rel. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Alarmtec Int'l Corp., 384 So.
2d 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See Borrell-Bigsby Elec. Co. v. United Nations, Inc., 385 So. 2d
713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), holding that a fire alarm installer was not liable for a breach-of
warranty for a fire loss simply because the alarm system did not have an external or emer-
gency power source for sounding the alarm in the event of a power loss. In addition, the
court noted that there was unrebutted testimony that an arsonist had caused the fire and
that this testimony supported an inference that the arsonist had damaged the alarm; the
evidence did not show that the installer's breach of warranty had caused the loss. The court
did not reach the question whether the installer of a fire alarm should be liable for a breach
of warranty in the same way that an installer of a burglar alarm system should be liable for
a burglary loss resulting from a defective alarm system. Id. at 714 n.2. The court stated,
however, that it perceived no difference in principle between a burglar alarm and a fire
alarm regarding liability for a defect.
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warranties, the result seems questionable because there is no indi-
cation that the clause explicitly disclaimed the implied warranty of
merchantability in conspicuous print as required by section 2-316
of the U.C.C 6
J. Statutory Interpretation
A recent case decided under section 501.204 of the Florida
Statutes (1979) held that a franchisee has no cause of action
against a franchisor for unfair trade practices unless he shows that
the franchisor's acts caused his injury. If the franchisee knew that
some of the franchisor's statements were false, a jury could find
that the statements did not cause any loss alleged by the fran-
chisee, because the franchisor had not deceived him.3 7
A Florida court recently interpreted section 212.06(5)(a) of the
Florida Statutes (1979) to mean that a dealer's expectation of the
ultimate destination of his product determines sales tax conse-
quences. Thus, if a Florida seller sells goods "F.O.B. [a foreign
state]" and delivers them to a common carrier under this F.O.B.
arrangement, or delivers goods to a licensed exporter for export to
a foreign country, then Florida sales taxes are not payable.38
III. BULK SALES
Article 9 of the U.C.C. entitles secured creditors to preference
in the distribution of sales proceeds from the bulk sale of a busi-
ness when the proceeds are insufficient to pay both secured and
unsecured creditors in full.s9 Section 6-106(4) of the U.C.C.4o re-
quires pro rata payment of all the debts of the vendor; read in
conjunction with Article 9, this section allows for the priority of
secured creditors over any pro rata distribution. 41
The protection afforded a bulk sales creditor under Article 6
of the Code depends on the satisfaction of the seller's due process
rights. The recent case of B & B Drugs St. Petersburg, Inc. v. Mc-
Kesson & Robbins Drug Co.42 illustrates this constitutional limita-
tion. In B & B Drugs, the seller, Kasper, had a security interest in
36. FLA. STAT. § 672.316 (1979).
37. Chicken Unlimited, Inc. v. Bockover, 374 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
38. Linder Indus. Mach. Co. v. Berry, 385 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). For an excel-
lent literal interpretation of the statute, see Judge Campbell's dissent. Id. at 745.
39. Huguelet v. M & M Assoc., Inc., 375 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
40. FLA. STAT. § 676.106(4) (1979).
41. Huguelet v. M & M Assoc., Inc., 375 So. 2d 1150; see FLA. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1979).
42. 380 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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the inventory of Acorn Drugs. Kasper foreclosed and sold the in-
ventory of Acorn to B & B Holding, which gave back a purchase
money note and security agreement. B & B Holding then sold the
inventory to B & B Drugs. Later, McKesson & Robbins obtained a
judgment against Acorn; the judgment went unsatisfied. McKesson
brought supplementary proceedings, and the trial court invalidated
the sales between Kasper and B & B Holding and between B & B
Holding and B & B Drugs on the ground that Acorn designed the
sales to defraud its creditor, McKesson. Unfortunately for McKes-
son, Kasper was never served with process and never appeared in
the proceedings. The appellate court held that the invalidation of
the sale between Kasper and B & B Holding was unconstitutional
because it would deprive Kasper of a property right-the collection
of his note and security agreement-without due process.
In another case dealing with the issue of fraudulent bulk sales,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, indicated that a
court should not deny a buyer all relief just because the requested
relief is impossible.4 s In that recent case, the court stated that
when a court cannot restore the status quo by rescinding a fraudu-
lent sale of a going business (including inventory), the court should
either award the buyer damages against the seller or award a setoff
against the purchase money note and mortgage held by the seller.
It is reversible error for the court to refuse to award any penalty
against the buyer for failure to make payments on his note and
mortgage.
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Express Warranties, Strict Liability, and Negligence
In 1980, the Florida courts continued to seek ways to impose
liability on manufacturers of products causing injury to Florida
consumers. The courts grounded liability on warranty, strict liabil-
ity, and negligence. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
addressed the problem of a manufacturer's liability under war-
ranty for the negligent assembly of a product by its franchised
dealer." In that case, the front wheel of a bicycle hit a bump and
fell off, resulting in injury to the rider. The appellate court con-
cluded that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the retail
43. Vinyl Repair Serv., Inc. v. Menzel, 385 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). For a case
articulating the badges of a fraudulent sale of a business under § 726.01 of the Florida
Statutes (1979), see Stephens v. Kies Oil Co., 386 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
44. Caporale v. Raleigh Indus. of America, Inc., 382 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
[Vol. 35:465
COMMERCIAL LAW
dealer and the manufacturer, because expert testimony showed
that the wheel would not have fallen off if the dealer had properly
assembled the bicycle. Additionally, the court noted that the man-
ufacturer warranted its bicycles to be free of any defects in mate-
rial and workmanship, and that warranty extended to the full as-
sembly of the bicycle. The court therefore held that the
manufacturer would be liable if a jury found the dealer's assembly
improper.
Applying the specialized rules on automobile manufacturer li-
ability, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, considered a
"second collision" (between a passenger and his vehicle) or "crash-
worthy vehicle" case. In that decision in 1979,15 the court held that
the strict liability rule of West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.46 had
overruled the holding of Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho47 that an auto
manufacturer's liability derives from a duty of reasonable care
under ordinary negligence principles. The court, however, certified
the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Two cases resolved that a plaintiff's knowledge of the poten-
tial danger in a product will not preclude his later negligence claim
against the manufacturer. In one case, the court held the manufac-
turer of a forklift liable for a driver's injuries because the lift had
no bumper or other device to safeguard the driver's feet during a
collision." The court concluded that the driver's knowledge of a
similar accident involving a fellow worker did not bar the driver's
negligence action, but might constitute a partial defense under
comparative negligence theory. Similarly, the District Court of Ap-
peal, First District, ruled that even if the plaintiff had knowledge
of an obvious danger, that knowledge would not defeat his subse-
quent suit for negligence. 4" The court also held that the trial court
erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff's expert witness to testify
about the ineffectiveness of a remedial measure employed by the
defendant. The court noted that although evidence of post-acci-
dent remedies is inadmissible to show a pre-existing danger, it is
permissible to rebut the defendant's testimony that no changes in
the product were necessary.
When two manufacturers assemble a finished product that
causes an injury, a court may not find joint liability unless each
45. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
46. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
47. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
48. Martinez v. Clark Equip. Co., 382 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
49. Hethcoat v. Chevron Oil Co., 383 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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manufacturer was negligent. In the case 'of Shelton v. Wisconsin
Motor Corp.,50 a lawnmower manufacturer installed a large gaso-
line engine made by another manufacturer, so that its rope starter
was dangerous to the user and injured his eye. The court correctly
ruled that although it was not negligence as a matter of law to
install a rope-starting engine, a jury could find that the lawnmower
manufacturer had negligently created a dangerous condition. In
this case, the engine manufacturer was not liable because there was
no design defect in the engine.
The issue of release from joint liability arose in a case decided
in 1979, in which an insured released his fire insurer and "any
other person [or] corporation . . . charged with responsibility for
injuries to the . . property of the" insured.51 The court held that
the release did not apply to a contractor who allegedly caused a
fire loss by negligently installing heating and cooling equipment on
the insured's property. The court reasoned that the insurer and
contractor were not joint tortfeasors; thus, the contractor was lia-
ble for his own negligence.
A plaintiff sued on an unsuccessful but interesting negligence
theory in one case reviewed in 1980 by the District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District. The case represents an attempted extension
of the foreseeability requirement in negligence actions. The defen-
dant was a tire merchant who improperly placed a customer's
spare tire upside down in her automobile trunk. The tire rattled
and the customer tried to remove the tire. Unfortunately, she suf-
fered a hernia while attempting to do so. The court held that the
hernia was not foreseeably connected to the installation of the tire
and that the seller was not negligent.52
The doctrine of foreseeability took a strange twist in Kikis v.
Ford Motor Co.53 In Kikis, a motorist was changing a flat tire when
the hubcap flew off and the motorist caught it in mid-air. The mo-
torist's fingers slid into a port hole in the hubcap and its rough
edges cut the tendons and muscles in two fingers. The jury and the
appellate court agreed that an injury of this nature was a likely
50. 382 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
51. Newsome v. Finch, 375 So. 2d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
52. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lippincott, 383 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
See Hurd v. Munford, Inc., 378 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), in which Judge Ervin, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, stated that a retail gasoline dealer may be liable
under breach of warranty and strict liability theories if he permits a customer to fill a
plastic milk container with gasoline, and the gasoline later spills from the container, igniting
and injuring the customer.
53. 386 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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result of the sharp edges in the hubcap. The injury was foresee-
able; therefore, the manufacturer was liable for its negligence.
Another recent case exemplifies the difficulty of resolving the
question of a manufacturer's negligence as a matter of law. In Hef-
fernan v. Consolidated Aluminum, Inc.," the court held that the
trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the manufac-
turer, of a ladder that allegedly failed to grip an asphalt surface
properly. The only evidence submitted by the manufacturer was
the ladder's accident-free record from other users The court found
that the evidence conclusively showed the ladder owner free of
negligence, but the manufacturer's proof was inconclusive on the
issue of negligence in designing and making the ladder.
B. Statute of Limitations
Two cases touched on issues under the statute of limitations.
In a case decided in 1979, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, found that the facts fell within a broad four-year statute of
limitations rather than the two-year medical malpractice statute.5
In that case, a paid blood donor contracted hepatitis allegedly
from a blood laboratory's negligence in extracting blood. The court
reasoned that since the donor was neither a patient nor the recipi-
ent of medical services by a "health care provider,"5 6 section
95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1979) did not apply to him.
Instead, the court viewed him as a mere vendor of blood and ap-
plied the general four-year limitation of section 95.11(3)(a) to his
action for negligence.
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the constitutional-
ity of section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1979), which pro-
vides that an action for products liability must commence within
twelve years of delivery to the original purchaser regardless of the
date when the purchaser discovered the defect. In Purk v. Federal
Press Co.,57 a punch press delivered in 1961 injured a worker
before the statute took effect. The worker challenged the statute
on access-to-court principles. The court based its decision on the
statute's one-year saving clause that permitted the plaintiff to sue
as late as January 1, 1976, for her injury of April 24, 1973. From
54. 387 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). But see Tschudy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 378 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), upholding a trial court's directed verdict that Fire-
stone had no duty to warn against making certain kinds of repairs to its tires.
55. Durden v. American Hoap. Supply Corp., 375 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
56. Id. at 1099.
57. 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980).
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the tenor of the decision and in light of Overland Construction Co.
v. Sirmons,'5 the court will probably invalidate this section of the
statute in any case in which it would absolutely bar an action
before the plaintiff suffered injury.
C. Indemnification
It is a well-established general rule that a court will not con-
strue a contract of indemnity to require a user, lessee, or bailee of
chattels to indemnify its supplier against the supplier's own negli-
gence unless expressly provided by the contract. The Supreme
Court of Florida followed this rule in a case decided in 1979,59 in
which the court also extended the indemnity rule to cases of joint
indemnity.
In another case in 1979, the Supreme Court of Florida consid-
ered whether the manufacturer of a product could seek indemnity
against the product's purchaser. 0 The court held that for a manu-
facturer to have a common law right of indemnity against a pur-
chaser whose employee is killed by either a manufacturing defect
or the purchaser's improper use, the manufacturer must prove it-
self completely faultless. The manufacturer must also show that all
the fault lies with the purchaser. Furthermore, the trial court will
not weigh the degrees of fault between the manufacturer and the
purchaser.
A number of factors may affect the availability of indemnity in
a particular set of circumstances. In one case decided in 1979, an
appellate court held that the active negligence of a lessor of a mo-
bile scaffold prevented his recovery under a theory of common law
indemnity.61 In that case, a Florida statute" also prevented the
lessor's recovery even though the lessor asserted that the building's
general contractor had agreed to indemnify the lessor for the les-
sor's own negligence. The statute invalidates this type of indem-
nity agreement in construction contracts unless the agreement
58. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); see notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra.
59. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co., 374 So. 2d
487 (Fla. 1979), aff'g in part and rev'g in part Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co. v.
Charles Poe Masonry, Inc., 358 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
60. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979), rev'g Home Indem.
Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Schauer, 374 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). For a fuller discussion of the Houdaille case,
see Chesrow, Howard, & Howard, Fault and Equity: Implied Indemnity After Houdaille,
34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 727 (1980).
61. A-T-O, Inc. v. Garcia, 374 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
62. FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (1979).
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places a monetary limit on the indemnification and the agreement
is part of the project specifications or bid documents, or the in-
demnitee gives the indemnitor specific consideration as provided in
the contract. 5s
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently ad-
dressed the question whether a manufacturer has a duty to indem-
nify a retailer for the retailer's attorney's fees in defending a prod-
ucts liability suit by a consumer. The court held that although the
retailer had won a summary judgment in the consumer's suit, the
retailer had no indemnity claim, without a contract with the manu-
facturer providing for legal fees. The court stated that it knew of
"no theory upon which it can be said that a manufacturer has a
duty, absent an express contract, to insulate its retailers from un-
proven claims of dissatisfied customers.
64
D. Liability of a Manufacturer's Successor
In a development in 1980, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, followed a general rule concerning the liability of a succes-
sor corporation for a manufacturer's defective products. The court
held that an injured consumer may not impose liability upon the
manufacturer's successor when there is no proof that the successor
impliedly or expressly assumed the debts of the manufacturer and
when the manufacturer demonstrably "is still a viable, ongoing en-
tity, amenable to personal service and financially responsible.""
V. REAL PROPERTY SALES
A. Express Warranties
Two recent cases illustrate the Florida courts' literal interpre-
tation of the scope of express warranties to protect buyers without
overstepping contractual bounds. In Campbell v. Rawls,66 the sales
contract provided: "Seller warrants air conditioning and heating
systems . . . to be in working order at time of Closing. Buyer, at
his expense, may inspect such systems 3 days prior to Closing, and
63. Id.
64. Maple Chair Co. v. W.S. Badcock Corp., 385 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
See Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 374 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979), which held that a manufacturer had a contractual duty to indemnify an insurer fdr
any loss incurred as the result of the insurer's negligence in inspecting the manufacturer's
products.
65. Kinsler v. Rohm Tool Corp., 386 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
66. 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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in the event discrepancies exist, Seller will repair at Seller's ex-
pense. ' 167 Although covenants normally merge in the deed at clos-
ing, the court in Campbell concluded that the express warranty
was an independent covenant that did not merge in the deed and
survived the closing. In assessing damages for the buyer, however,
the court carefully adhered to the literal wording of the clause and
ordered that the seller owed the buyer the cost of putting the air
conditioning and heating systems in working order.
When a condominium developer gives an express warranty, no
matter how limited, he does not avoid implied warranties without
an express disclaimer. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, followed this rule in Rapallo South, Inc. v. Jack Taylor De-
velopment Corp.6 8 and held that a buyer could sue a developer for
breach of implied warranties not expressly disclaimed in a written
express warranty.
B. Negligence
When lack of privity bars an action by condominium purchas-
ers for breach of implied warranties of habitability, the remote
purchasers may still sue the builder for negligence. In Parliament
Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Realty, Inc.,'9 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the damages
caused by the negligence of the builder and architect were reasona-
bly foreseeable and consequently actionable.
Although the court in Parliament focused on the issue of fore-
seeability, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in a simi-
lar decision, concentrated on the question of a manufacturer's duty
running to a remote purchaser.7 0 The Second District found that a
school board could sue for damages caused by defective roofing
materials if there was "a duty between the parties independent of
the contract. 7 1
These decisions do not indicate that Florida courts will always
strain to find the existence of a duty that overcomes the absence of
privity of contract. The case of Petty v. Houston Homes, Inc.72 ex-
presses the view that a building contractor's liability is not eternal.
67. Id. at 745.
68. 375 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
69. 377 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
70. Highlands County School Bd. v. K.D. Hedin Constr., Inc., 382 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1980).
71. Id. at 91.
72. 386 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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A contractor employed a termite exterminating company during
the construction of a house. The exterminator agreed to treat the
property for subterranean termites for a period of five years with-
out cost to the owner, despite any change of ownership. Two years
after the contractor sold the house, the new owner called the exter-
minator to treat the house for termites. Alleging that the poisons
used by the exterminator caused the death of his minor child, the
homeowner sued the contractor for the exterminator's negligence.
The court held that because the exterminator was no longer associ-
ated with the general contractor and was instead the independent
contractor of the owner, the general contractor was not liable for
the acts of the exterminator.
In a similar vein, the case of Blackton Building Supply Co. v.
Garesche 7 held that the distributor of a product found safe and
nondefective by a jury is not liable for the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor when the distributor has no control over that
contractor.
In a case in 1980, the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, also dealt with this elusive interplay between degrees of con-
trol and duty.74 The court acknowledged that a construction lender
is not ordinarily under any duty to inspect construction work on a
condominium and is not liable for defects to condominium buyers.
But when the lender forecloses a project, completes construction,
takes title, and advertises and sells units to buyers, then the lender
acts like a developer, not a lender. The court concluded that, like a
developer, the lender is responsible for its express representations
to buyers and "for patent construction defects in the entire condo-
minium project and for breach of any applicable warranties due to
defects in the portions of the project completed by" the lender.7
C. Statute of Limitations
In Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons," the Supreme
Court of Florida declared section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Stat-
utes (1979) invalid. The legislature responded by amending the
statute." The constitutionally offensive part of the statute was its
absolute bar to lawsuits brought against a contractor, architect, or
engineer, initiated more than a given number of years after events
73. 383 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
74. Chotka v. Fidelco Growth Investors, 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
75. Id. at 1170.
76. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); see notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
77. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-322, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1979)).
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connected with the construction of improvements to real property.
The amendment in 1980 increased the time limitation from twelve
to fifteen years and provided for an alternative starting point for
the running of the limitation period. The period runs from the
date of a certificate of occupancy or from the time of contracting
or of ownership, whichever is later.
It is doubtful that the arbitrary addition of three years will
have any substantial effect in light of the court's decision in Over-
land. The court did not premise that decision on mere numbers,
but upon the unconstitutional taking of the right to sue from a
person who has no knowledge of a defect or injury.
VI. SHIPPING AND WAREHOUSING
A. Shipping Problems
Three recent Florida decisions involved various aspects of the
shipping industry. In the case of Florida-Texas Freight, Inc. v.
Hawkins,8 the Florida Public Service Commission proposed new
rules governing the filing of tariffs by freight forwarders. The Com-
mission did not prepare an economic impact statement, as appar-
ently required by section 120.54(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes
(1979). It found that the proposed rules had no economic impact
because they resulted in no additional shipping costs, but merely
implemented established procedures. The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, in a 4-to-2 decision, held that when the Commission found no
economic impact, it did not need to track the seven steps in the
statute to declare that there would be no economic impact. The
court interpreted section 120.54(2)(a) as a legislative attempt to
"promote agency introspection in administrative rulemaking, ' ' 79
and implied that the "no impact" declaration fulfilled the legisla-
tive purpose. The aggrieved party had introduced no evidence of
economic impact at the public hearing and did not raise the issue
until after the hearing examiner filed an unfavorable report.
A case decided in 1980 by the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, exemplifies how an airline may be liable beyond the con-
fines of the Warsaw Convention.80 In Compania de Aviacion
Faucett, S.A. v. Mulford,81 an airline's employees deliberately or
recklessly told passengers that their luggage was on board a flight
78. 379 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1980).
79. Id. at 946.
80. 49 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976).
81. 386 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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from the United States to Lima, Peru, when it had in fact been
removed from the aircraft. The passengers spent the remainder of
their vacation trying to find their luggage, which the airline did not
return to them until after they arrived home in Iowa. The Third
District upheld the trial court's ruling that because of the airline's
"willful misconduct," the Warsaw Convention did not limit the
passengers' recovery. 82
Another Third District decision dealt with the ad valorem tax
liability of shippers. Specifically, cargo containers used in seaborne
foreign commerce are subject to ad valorem taxation in Florida
even if they are in Florida for an average of only five months; year-
round situs is not required.83
B. Warehousing Problems
Florida courts commonly uphold limitation-of-liability clauses
in warehouse receipts. A district court of appeal extended this no-
tion to a limitation clause in a form entitled "Estimated Cost of
Services and Order for Service,"" which gave estimated charges for
hauling and storing. The bailor furnished a conservative estimate
of the value of her goods and signed the estimate form in several
places, including one place directly under the entered valuation
figure. The court reasoned that the bailor's acceptance of the esti-
mate was "tantamount to her acceptance of the bill of lading con-
taining the same limitation of liability."85 This extension is not in
itself too troubling. The bailor's claim against the warehouse, how-
ever, was based on negligent loss or conversion. The appellate
court's opinion, reversing a jury verdict in favor of the bailor, does
not recite whether the verdict was on negligence or on conversion.
If the jury based its verdict on a negligent loss, then the reversal is
correct. But if the jury found a conversion by the warehouseman,
then the decision is clearly wrong because no limitation clause will
protect the warehouseman from liability for its own conversion of
the goods.86
Amended section 7-403(1)(b) of the Florida U.C.C.87 provides
that in bailment cases involving goods worth more than $10,000,
the bailor must prove the warehouseman's negligence when the
82. Id. at 301.
83. Integrated Container Servs., Inc. v. Overstreet, 375 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
84. Brandon Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hall, 377 So. 2d 716, 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
85. Id. at 717.
86. FLA. STAT. § 677.204(2) (1979).
87. Id. § 677.403(l)(b).
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goods are damaged, destroyed, lost, or delayed in redelivery. Con-
versely, the statute implies that the bailee must prove freedom
from fault when the goods are worth $10,000 or less. The Supreme
Court of Florida has upheld the constitutionality of this amend-
ment, concluding that the legislature made a reasonable finding
that "mom and pop bailors"88 lacked the money to investigate the
cause of the loss in small bailments. This reasonable finding vali-
dated the statute under the equal protection clause of the state
constitution. The author, however, is inclined to agree with the dis-
senting view of Justice Boyd that the law is "unreasonable because
it embodies a classification based on financial status."89
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a court may define a
marina as a warehouseman under Article 7 of the U.C.C..9 0 To
claim a warehouseman's lien for storage, however, the marina must
issue a warehouse receipt under section 7-209 of the U.C.C.. 1 If
the marina does not issue a warehouse receipt, a court may invali-
date any sale of the stored boat to a bona fide purchaser. In addi-
tion, under section 85.031 of the Florida Statutes (1979), a marina
claiming a lien for labor or services must conduct a public sale, not
a private sale like the one held in this case. There is no provision
in the statutes, however, that a bona fide purchaser will necessarily
prevail over a boat owner if the marina does not comply with the
requirements of the statutory sale.
VII. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Jurisdiction
Florida courts will not liberally construe the Florida Statutes
to extend long-arm jurisdiction over foreign individuals and busi-
ness entities. For example, a housewife's isolated act of signing as
an accommodation co-maker of her husband's promissory note, the
proceeds of which benefited only his business, was not sufficient
under section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1979) to show that
she was engaging in business in Florida. Therefore, she was not
amenable to substituted service of process.2
88. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Gulf Fla. Terminal Co., 386 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 1980).
89. Id. at 533.
90. Richwagen v. Lilienthal, 386 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
91. FLA. STAT. § 677.209(1) (1979).
92. Connell v. Ott Research Dev., Inc., 377 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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In Caribe & Panama Investments, S.A. v. Christensen," a for-
eign corporation had executed and failed to honor a promissory
note that provided for payment in Miami. The corporation con-
ducted no business in Florida, owned no property there, and had
no officers or employees performing work in Florida. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the foreign corporation
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under sec-
tions 48.081, 48.181(1), and 48.193 of the Florida Statutes (1979)
merely because the corporation's president happened to reside in
Dade County, Florida. It appears, however, that based on the
breach of the contract calling for payment in Florida, jurisdiction
could have attached under section 48.194 of the Florida Statutes
(1979), if the plaintiff had made service of process in Panama.
B. Parol Evidence
Courts usually allow parol testimony to explain an ambiguous
signature. In a recent case, a corporate president executed a note
in his corporate capacity: "A & H Plumbing Corporation, Jose Ar-
menteros, President"; then, in executing the guarantee on the re-
verse side of the note, he wrote the word "President" next to his
signature over the typed words "Jose Armenteros." The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the latter signature was
ambiguous and parol testimony was appropriate to explain the
ambiguity.
9 4
Additionally, a district court of appeal held parol testimony
permissible under section 3-403 of the U.C.C. 5 to show that a cor-
porate officer signed a note in a representative rather than individ-
ual capacity when he signed in both his corporate and his individ-
ual name.96
Parol testimony was not proper, however, in a case dealing
with an attempted repudiation of personal liability when the indi-
vidual defendant signed ten promissory notes without indicating
he was signing as an agent and without stating the name of the
alleged principal. The appellate court's holding in that case was
correct under section 3-403 of the U.C.C..97 Based on one of the
comments to section 3-403,98 the court further held that parol evi-
93. 375 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
94. Bank of Miami v. Armenteros, 382 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
95. FLA. STAT. § 673.403 (1979).
96. Oppenheim v. Jules Jergensen Corp., 385 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
97. FLA. STAT. § 673.403 (1979).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.403, Comment 3 (West Supp. 1980).
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dence was inadmissible to reform the instrument for mistake.99
C. Statute of Limitations
Section 95.03(1) of the Florida Statutes (1979), as amended in
1975, provides that a cause of action against makers, indorsers, and
guarantors of demand notes without specific maturity dates ac-
crues on the first written demand for payment. Former section 3-
122(1)(b) of the Florida U.C.C., 100 on the other hand, stated that a
cause of action on a demand note accrues on its date or, if it has no
date, on the date of its issue. Although Florida amended section 3-
122 to give precedence to section 95.031(1) in 1977,101 the conflict
between the two statutes continues to generate litigation. For ex-
ample, in a suit on a promissory note given in 1968, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held in 1980 that the more specific
terms of the amendment in 1975 to section 95.031(1) took prece-
dence over the more general terms of the pre-1977 version of sec-
tion 3-122(1)(b).10 2 Because the time for bringing suit under the
1974 statute of limitations had not expired when the legislature
adopted the amendment in 1975, the court allowed the plaintiff to
take advantage of the amending statute, which gave additional
time for bringing suit. The court did not rely on the amendment to
section 3-122 in 1977, ostensibly because the statute merely codi-
fied the result in the case."'8
Another recent case interpreting the amended statute of limi-
tations demonstrates the enormous exposure associated with de-
mand notes. In that case, the court held that the five-year statute
of limitations might not bar a suit brought twenty years after the
demand note was signed if the first written demand was the suit
itself.104
D. Defenses to Nonpayment of Promissory Notes
There are a number of statutory defenses available in suits on
99. Schwartz v. Disneyland Vista Records, 383 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
100. FLA. STAT. § 673.122(1)(b) (1976).
101. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-54, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 673.122(1)(b) (1975), which
now states: "[iun the case of a note payable on demand, as provided in s. 95.031(1)").
102. Wetmore v. Brennan, 378 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
103. Id. at 81 n.2: "Those amendments are not material to the issue in this appeal and
are not considered."
104. Jones v. Rainey, 386 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The Second District re-




promissory notes. Under section 733.709 of the Florida Statutes
(1979) dealing with claims against estates, if the holder of an un-
matured promissory note has filed suit within a year after filing a
probate claim, then he no longer has a claim. 10 5 This statute has no
effect on the lien of a recorded mortgage or security interest, nor
on the lien of any creditor who has possession of collateral. A sim-
ple delay in bringing suit on a promissory note will not constitute
laches, because the statute of limitations provides the appropriate
defense for the running of time.101
The maker of a .note used the defense of res judicata in the
case of Truitt v. Truitt.107 The Truitts' dissolution of marriage fol-
lowed a stipulation in which the husband conveyed certain real
property to the wife and the wife, among other things, dismissed
with prejudice her counterclaim on a promissory note. The hus-
band had testified at the dissolution proceeding that the signature
on the note was not his. More than two years after the dissolution,
the wife sued her former husband on the note, and he asserted the
defense of res judicata. The wife alleged that the husband had per-
jured himself on the authenticity of his signature; since he had
committed a fraud upon the court, she could assert her claim after
the one-year period prescribed in rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure. The trial court and appellate court concluded,
however, that perjury during court proceedings was intrinsic fraud,
not an extrinsic fraud upon the court. The wife's collateral attack
on the judgment entered more than one year before her attack was
impermissible. The matter was res judicata because the wife had
had the opportunity to contest the husband's denial of his signa-
ture in the original action but had failed to do so.
The case of Robinson v. Brunson"0 8 presented the question
whether the drawer of an undated check, never presented for pay-
ment by the payee, is discharged from honoring the underlying
promissory note. In Robinson, the maker of a note, deceased at the
time of the action, had borrowed money from the payee in ex-
change for his note and an undated check for the amount of the
note. The payee-lender never presented the check for payment and
later brought suit on the note against the maker's estate. The trial
court held that the underlying obligation was discharged. The ap-
105. In re Estate of Utley, 380 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), which held that the
enumeration of exceptions in the statute is exclusive.
106. Kay v. Fernandez, 373 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
107. 383 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
108. 383 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
pellate court, in reversing the trial court, held that under section 3-
502(1)(b) of the U.C.C., 109 the deceased drawer of the check would
escape liability on the underlying obligation only if the drawee
bank had become insolvent during the period in which the payee
unreasonably delayed presenting the check for payment. Since the
bank was not insolvent, the drawer remained liable, and the trial
court should have entered judgment for the payee.
E. Accord and Satisfaction
Several recent cases addressed whether a creditor may effec-
tively disclaim acceptance of a proposed accord and satisfaction af-
ter cashing his debtor's proposed settlement check.
In Hannah v. James A. Ryder Corp.,"0 the plaintiff sued for
over $150,000 in sales commissions. The defendant alleged that the
parties had reached an accord and satisfaction for a $20,000 settle-
ment because the plaintiff had cashed three of defendant's checks
totalling $4,000. The defendant had mailed, along with his checks,
letters indicating that when he paid the $20,000 there would be no
further liability. The plaintiff indorsed and deposited each check
under an indorsement that stated that he was cashing the checks
under protest and not in acceptance of the reduced figure of
$20,000. He did not return a signed copy of the defendant's letter
of compromise as requested. The trial court entered summary
judgment for the debtor on the grounds that there was an accord
and satisfaction. The appellate court reversed, holding that: (1)
The creditor had never signed the letters requested by the debtor
to indicate acceptance of the compromise offer, and the checks he
had cashed were only installments not tendered in full satisfaction
of the claim; (2) Since the debtor had stopped sending checks after
the third check when the creditor indicated he would not agree to
the compromise, a jury could find "that this constituted a with-
drawal or abandonment of the undertaking in acquiescence to its
clear rejection""' by the creditor; and (3) If the new agreement
was only partially executed, it could not operate as satisfaction of
the original agreement. The court expressly declined to deal with
Miller v. Jung,112 which held that when a payee indorses a check
109. FLA. STAT. § 673.502(1)(b) (1979).
110. 380 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
111. Id. at 510.
112. 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); see First Nat'l Bank v. Caribe Equip. Corp.,
378 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), in which defendant makers and quarantors of promissory
notes successfully asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction when they were sued on
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under protest, the protest alone may prevent an accord and satis-
faction under section 1-207 of the U.C.C.113 even though the check
states that it is in complete accord and satisfaction of a debt.
Another aspect of accord and satisfaction appeared in Yelen v.
Cindy's, Inc."" A franchisee alleged violations of the franchise
agreement and sought to recover the franchise fee of $10,000. The
franchisor refused to return this amount, but offered to settle the
dispute for $6,000 and mailed a release and check for $6,000 to the
franchisee with a letter asking the franchisee to return the check if
it was unwilling to accept the settlement offer. Apparently, the
check also contained similar language, which the court mislabeled
as a "restrictive endorsement."' ' 5 The franchisee deleted this lan-
guage and substituted the words "Received as partialo agreement
without prejudice, under protest, with full exclusive reservation of
rights."11 The franchisee cashed the check and then sued for the
balance of the fee. The trial court entered summary judgment for
the franchisor and the appellate court affirmed, holding that as a
matter of law, the circumstances under which the franchisee had
received and cashed the check established an accord and
satisfaction.
11 7
F. Documentary Stamp Taxes
In a case clarifying the exemption of renewal notes from docu-
mentary stamp taxes, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a dis-
trict court's declaratory judgment interpreting sections 201.08(1)
and 201.09 of the Florida Statutes (1979).111 The court ruled that
when a debtor renews a promissory note in another note increasing
the original obligation, he must pay documentary stamp taxes on
the full amount of the second note. For example, if the debtor bor-
rows $10,000 and then later borrows an additional $5,000 and signs
a note for $15,000 incorporating both the renewal and the addi-
tional loan, the debtor must affix stamps on his new note for the
full $15,000. If the borrower signs a separate note for the $5,000
and a separate renewal note for the original $10,000 owed, then he
the notes. The bank claimed that the customer gave it accounts receivable and other assets
for additional collateral rather than to effect an accord and satisfaction.
113. FLA. STAT. § 671.207 (1979).
114. 386 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
115. Id. at 1235. A restrictive indorsement is defined by FLA. STAT. § 673.205 (1979).
116. 386 So. 2d at 1235.
117. Id.
118.. Department of Revenue v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 374 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1979).
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pays taxes only on the increased amount.
G. Procedural Problems
An appellate court considered an unusual procedural problem
involving an unsuccessful counterclaim on dishonored cashier's
checks in Hilton Casinos, Inc. v. First National Bank." 9 In that
case, a bank issued four cashier's checks to the payee, who was
planning a gambling excursion. When the payee arrived at the ca-
sino hotel he felt ill and the hotel's employees treated him with an
injection that allegedly impaired his judgment. During the period
of alleged incompetence, the payee gambled and incurred gambling
losses. He indorsed his cashier's checks over to the casino to cover
his gambling debt. The payee then had the issuing bank stop pay-
ment on the checks and agreed to indemnify the bank for any
losses resulting from the dishonor. When the casino sued the bank
for payment, the bank filed a third-party claim against the payee
on his indemnity agreement. The payee filed a counterclaim
against the casino, alleging that the hotel employees had intention-
ally impaired his judgment and that this tortious behavior induced
him to indorse the cashier's checks. The payee attempted service
of process on the casino by mailing the counterclaim to the casino's
attorney. The casino moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction and for inadequate service of process.
The circuit court denied the motion and the casino appealed.
Without reaching the other issues, the appellate court dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under rule 1.180 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a third party defendant's
claim against the plaintiff is not permissible unless it arises "out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff."1 20 Because the
original suit was for payment of the checks and the counterclaim
asserted a tort by the casino employees, the court found no logical
relationship and ruled that there was no jurisdiction over the ca-
sino on the counterclaim.
The appellate court's view of the transaction was needlessly
restrictive. If the payee had succeeded in obtaining an injunction
against payment to the casino, then the hotel could not have recov-
ered from the bank and the payee would not have been liable on
his indemnity agreement. The payee's liability to the hotel was
119. 380 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
120. Id. at 1062.
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thus a crucial issue; the court should have found the counterclaim
"logically related to the subject matter of the original com-
plaint. ' ' 12 1 In light of this decision, attorneys who handle counter-
claims would do well to emphasize the interrelation of the various
aspects of the total transaction.
H. Conditional Promises
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, an appellate
court held that when a borrower agrees orally to repay a loan when
she has the financial ability to do so, the oral promise "creates only
a conditional promise to pay so that the creditor is not entitled to
recover on the promise unless the promisor is in fact able to pay
the debt."122 The court observed that in a minority of American
jurisdictions, such conditional wording creates an obligation to pay
within a reasonable time.
I. Indorsements
Under section 633-116 of the U.C.C.," 3' when a check is paya-
ble to two or more parties jointly, all payees must indorse that
check before a bank pays it. If a depositary bank allows its cus-
tomer to draw on a joint payee check in the absence of an indorse-
ment by all the payees, it may be liable to the aggrieved payee in
conversion under section 673.419 of the Florida Statutes.,,' A case
in 1980 demonstrated that if the aggrieved payee has received the
proper amount of money from the wrongful payee, however, then
the aggrieved payee has no cause of action against the depositary
bank."'e In that case, a contractor cashed a check payable to him
and his materialman, and his bank paid it without the material-
man's indorsement. Later, the contractor paid the materialman the
amount due him (less four cents). The materialman sued the de-
positary bank for wrongful payment of the first check. The court
held that the bank was absolved from liability even though it could
not show that the funds received by the materialman were pro-
ceeds of wrongful payment.
121. Id.
122. Hammond v. Bicknell, 379 So. 2d 680, 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
123. FLA. STAT. § 673.116 (1979).
124. Id. § 673.419.
125. First Independent Bank v. Stottlemyer & Shoemaker Lumber Co., 384 So. 2d 952
(Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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J. Legislation
The Florida Legislature made a number of changes to the
state laws regarding worthless checks and taxation of negotiable
instruments. For example, an amendment to section 201.08(3) of
the documentary stamp statutes'" provides that promissory notes
executed by students for federal or state financial aid require no
documentary stamps. This exemption unaccountably omits student
financial aid given by private institutions.
Section 199.12(1) of the Florida Statutes, dealing with intangi-
ble personal property taxes, now includes "all bills, notes, or ac-
counts receivable, obligations, or credits, wheresoever situated,
arising out of, or issued in connection with" 127 the sale of services
by any person representing business interests in the state, even
though that person claims domicile elsewhere. To forestall the pro-
vision's potential ill effects on international sales, the amendment
includes an exemption from the tax for all intangible personal
property issued in or arising out of an international banking
transaction.""8
An amendment in 1980 to the "worthless check" statute en-
compasses bank service charges and intent to defraud.' 9 Under
the amendment, an issuing bank's service charge has increased
from $5.00 to $10.00. Additionally, to make a prima facie showing
that the drawer of a bad check had intent to defraud, a payee may
now establish the drawer's identity more easily. Without writing all
identification data on the check itself as he would in a face-to-face
transaction, a payee who received the check by mail can simply
present the original contract, order, or request, signed by the
drawer. If a person cashes the check under a check-cashing card
bearing the drawer's signature and other identification, production
of the card is sufficient. Further, when a person draws a check on a
closed or nonexistent account, there is now a presumption that the
drawer had an intent to defraud, and he is not entitled to the nor-
mal seven days' notice accorded to those who issue checks backed
by insufficient funds.
126. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-220, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 201.08(3) (1979)).
127. Id. ch. 80-136, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 199.112(1) (1979)).
128. Id.
129. Id. ch. 80-301, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 832.07 (1979)).
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VIII. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
A. Jurisdiction
A promise to make payment in Florida under an assigned con-
tract and guaranty may not be a sufficient contact to give a Florida
court personal jurisdiction over the guarantor. In Lakewood Pipe,
Inc. v. D.I.H. Rubaii,"s0 the court held that a Texas company that
was the assignee and guarantor of a Florida contract was not sub-
ject to Florida's long-arm statute. The mere fact that the assigned
contract and guaranty required the Texas company to make pay-
ment in Florida was less than the minimum contact necessary to
satisfy due .process requirements under section 48.193 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1979).
B. Consideration
The defense of lack of consideration was an issue in a case in
1979.1' The president of a corporation personally indorsed a note,
acting as a guarantor; his corporation received all the funds. The
court found that his guaranty indorsement was supported by con-
sideration so that he was personally liable. The court reached the
correct conclusion even though it did not cite section 3-415 of the
U.C.C., which describes the liability of "accommodation
parties."' 3'1
C. Degree of Liability
The District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, distinguished be-
tween absolute and conditional guarantees in Rooks v. Shader. 83
In Rooks, a contract for sale of an enterprise, paid partially in
stock, provided that the sellers would have the right to sell corpo-
rate stock to the guarantors "in the event [a corporation] is unwill-
ing or unable to repurchase."'" The court declared that this provi-
sion was an absolute guaranty making the guarantors liable as soon
as the corporation failed to repurchase. Based on the court's ratio-
nale, had the agreement also declared the guarantors liable if the
seller could not recover from the corporation, the guaranty would
130. 379 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
131. Gordon v. Corporate Ins. Servs., Inc., 374 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
132. FLA. STAT. § 673.415 (1979). Comment 3 to this section of the U.C.C. is relevant to
these facts.
133. 384 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
134. Id. at 683.
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have been conditional. In that event, the guarantors would not
have been liable until the seller had first attempted recovery from
the corporation.
When a jury verdict exonerating defendant-guarantors goes
against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court will reverse.
For example, in Flagship Bank v. Bryan,16 evidence at trial estab-
lished that the property foreclosed upon was worth substantially
less than the debt and that the lender had obtained, but had not
collected, deficiency judgments against the makers and other guar-
antors. The jury's verdict for the defendant-guarantors was thus
contrary to the evidence. The District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, explained that although the guarantors were jointly liable for
the entire debt, payment by any party would release the others for
the portion paid.
Another Third District decision illustrates that a guarantor's
liability for a lessee's performance may turn on a contractual pro-
vision as well as on the lessee's negligence. In that case, the court
ruled that a guarantor was liable under a lease-bailment agreement
providing that the lessee-bailee would be liable for all losses re-
gardless of his negligence. The court observed that parties are al-
ways free to contract for greater liability than the law imposes, and
that the surety steps into the shoes of the party whose perform-
ance he assures." "
IX. MORTGAGES
A. Documentary Stamp Taxes
Florida courts have recently addressed a number of issues
dealing with documentary stamps on mortgages or mortgage-re-
lated documents. In 1979, the Supreme Court of Florida side-
stepped a challenge to the constitutionality of section 201.02(3) of
the Florida Statutes (1979).7 This statute imposes documentary
stamp taxes on purchases of ownership interests in cooperative
apartments. The plaintiff apartment owners challenging the stat-
ute alleged that the Department of Revenue's retroactive applica-
tion of the statute was an unconstitutional taking. The court
agreed that the statute should apply only to future buyers, but
ruled that the owners did not have standing to bring a constitu-
tional challenge, because the statute did not affect them.
135. 384 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
136. Elliott v. Sheridan, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1979).
137. Department of Revenue v. Swinscoe, 376 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1979).
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Another ruling against the Department of Revenue position
concerned a transfer for which the grantor received no considera-
tion.1 8 The grantor became liable on his guaranty to pay a mort-
gage. He quitclaimed the mortgaged property to his wholly-owned
corporation, which never agreed to assume the mortgage, never
made any payments, and in fact went bankrupt. The land was
worth much less than the mortgage balance at the time of the quit-
claim. The Department of Revenue nevertheless attempted to tax
the quitclaim transfer on the theory that a grantee normally makes
mortgage payments that constitute consideration because they re-
lieve the grantor from his duty to pay. The court rejected this ar-
gument and did not order the grantor to pay documentary stamp
taxes on his quitclaim deed.
In a case in 1980 upholding the Department of Revenue's posi-
tion, a purchaser agreed to assume and pay an existing mortgage.
Almost simultaneously, the mortgagee released the original mort-
gagor from part of the debt. Despite the release, the Department of
Revenue assessed taxes on the assumption agreement. The court
explained that the Department assesses taxes solely upon the doc-
uments and not upon "transactions contemplated by the docu-
ments .... The liability to pay the documentary stamp tax, as
well as the amount of the tax, is to be solely determined by the
form and face of the instrument and not by the proof of extrinsic
facts." 3 9
B. Usury
In North American Mortgage Investors v. Cape San Blas
Joint Venture,40 the Supreme Court of Florida resolved a number
of issues under Florida's usury laws. The court concluded that if a
lender employs an agent to effectuate a loan and the agent charges
a commission for his services, that commission is interest. If the
total interest charged for the loan exceeds the lawful rate, the
court may presume the corrupt intent necessary to establish usury.
The court further held that the correct penalty for usurious inter-
est exacted from a corporate borrower is "forfeiture of the interest
reserved or collected by the lender regardless of the principal
amount of the obligation. 14 1 On this point, the court specifically
138. Gruman v. Department of Revenue, 379 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
139. Hialeah, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 380 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
140. 378 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1979).
141. Id. at 295. See Hamm v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 379 So. 2d 1300 (Fla.
2d DCA 1980), which in several pages of dictum (less than a page is devoted to the facts of
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disapproved of the holding of the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, in Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key,
Inc.1 42 that the Florida Statutes section 687.11(4) (1979) mandates
forfeiture of double the usurious interest charged.
C. Subordination
Attorneys who make mortgage subordination agreements
should make certain that the parties executing the agreements
have the legal authority to subordinate. The recent case of Wil-
liams, Salomon, Kanner & Damian v. American Bankers Life As-
surance Co.'4 8 illustrates the' importance of this requirement. In
Williams, a first mortgagee loaned additional money, relying on a
subordination agreement. The subordination agreement provided
that the second mortgage was inferior to the new mortgage em-
bracing the first mortgagee's first and third mortgages. Unfortu-
nately, the second mortgagee had assigned its mortgage as collat-
eral to its own creditor before making the subordination
agreement. In foreclosure proceedings brought by the first mortga-
gee, who now claimed first mortgage status for both its loans, the
appellate court concluded that the second mortgagee had no power
to subordinate the rights of its assignee-creditor. The foreclosing
mortgagee could thus claim first mortgage status for only its origi-
nal loan; the later advance was inferior to the second mortgage.
D. Payment and Satisfaction
Normally, when a mortgagor delivers a cashier's check to a
mortgagee, the mortgagor has made final payment and is entitled
to his cancelled note and a satisfaction of mortgage. In a recent
case, however, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that a mortgage satisfaction delivered in exchange for a cashier's
check drawn on a foreign bank was merely conditional. 44 The
opinion indicated that the mortgagee had not delivered the origi-
nal note with the satisfaction and that he might have doubted the
solidarity of the bank, which had no address except a foreign post-
office box. The court held that acceptance of this check by the
mortgagee created only a presumption of payment that was rebut-
the case) attempts to show the various ways of interpreting FLA. STAT. § 687.03(3) (1979)
when a bank makes loan charges at the inception of the loan, and later accelerates the loan.
142. 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
143. 379 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
144. Cooper v. Wolkowitz, 375 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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ted by proof that the check was dishonored. In addition, the court
rejected an argument that the parties had reached an accord and
satisfaction. Neither the court nor the parties seemed aware of the
relevance of section 3-802 of the U.C.C..145 This section would dis-
charge the mortgagor when he tendered a check issued by a bank
unless recourse to him appeared on the instrument or the parties
had agreed otherwise.
In another recent case, a rather indignant opinion by the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fifth District, quickly disposed of a dispute
about an overpayment. The attorneys for both parties miscalcu-
lated the amount of a mortgagee prepayment; thus, the mortgagor
overpaid the mortgagees. The recipients of this windfall did not
return it, but alleged that rescission was inappropriate because the
mortgagor had made a unilateral mistake. The court showed no
interest in the subtle distinctions between unilateral and mutual
mistake argued by counsel and summarily ordered that the over-
paying party recover the overpayment. 46
The complicated case of Capital America, Inc. v. Industrial
Discounts, Inc.147 points out the dangers for a secondary mortgagee
who loans money to pay off a mortgage without taking possession
of the cancelled note and without dealing directly with the mortga-
gee. In that case, three mortgages held by a first mortgagee secured
certain property. The property owner borrowed money from a
third party and agreed to pay off the three mortgages to give first
mortgagee status to the third party. The third party made the loan
in exchange for three satisfactions; however, the property owner
had forged the satisfactions, and the first mortgagee still held the
original promissory notes. To prevent discovery of his fraud, the
property owner continued to make payments on the "paid" mort-
gages. The property owner later sold the property to a purchaser
who knew of the third party's mortgage but did not know of the
first three mortgages still outstanding. When the third party's
mortgage came due, the purchaser paid it. The purchaser received
an unpleasant surprise when the first mortgagee demanded pay-
ment of the first three mortgages. The purchaser refused to pay.
The court held that the innocent purchaser could not rescind pay-
ment to the innocent third party lender, because both were equally
the victims of the property owner's fraud. Nor was the third party
145. FLA. STAT. § 673.802 (1979).
146. Ferguson v. Cotler, 382 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
147. 383 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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lender liable to the purchaser in negligence for not taking posses-
sion of the original promissory notes. Because of his failure to
search the public records, the purchaser had to pay all four mort-
gages. But if the purchaser had not paid the third party's mort-
gage, the third party would have been in the unenviable position of
holding a fourth mortgage. The third party could have avoided the
entire problem if he or his attorney had dealt directly with the first




Three recent cases touched on the procedural ramifications of
mortgage foreclosures. Invalid service of process became an issue in
one case when notice of suit by publication ordered the defendants
to file an answer. 4" Before the answer was due, the clerk entered a
default. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held this
premature entry of default void and subject to the defendants' col-
lateral attack. The court also held that the defendants need not
show a meritorious defense under rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure because the court lacked jurisdiction over the
defendants.
A trial court's reservation of jurisdiction to decide the disposi-
tion of any surplus from a foreclosure sale was an important factor
in a case decided in 1979.149 In that case, the judicial sale gener-
ated proceeds in excess of the first mortgage, but the mortgagor-
owners did not file an answer to the foreclosure suit. The appellate
court held that this failure did not preclude their later claim to the
proceeds; their security interest had priority over the claims of jun-
ior creditors. Apparently, the court based its decision on another
creditor's earlier request for distribution of the excess proceeds by
the court and the court's retention of jurisdiction over the matter.
The court also stated that in such a case, the trial court should
determine the interests of the mortgagors and other defendants at
an evidentiary hearing.
148. Overholser v. Overstreet, 383 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
149. Schroth v. Cape Coral Bank, 377 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). See Westminster
Foundation, Inc. v. Amerifirst Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 383 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980),
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a receiver to pay the
holder of an alleged first mortgage the monthly accrued income of the property during the
foreclosure proceeding. In that case, the mortgagee, a prosperous savings and loan associa-
tion, agreed to repay any funds received with interest, in the event that it lost the case.
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Another recent case dealt with the assumption of unpaid taxes
before a foreclosure sale. 150 A foreclosing mortgagee bid to buy
property for the full amount of his judgment on the note but did
not pay the taxes owed on the property. He asked the trial court to
add the taxes to the amount owed by the mortgagor. The court
held that the mortgagee could not obtain the taxes from remaining
funds held by the property's receiver. The court reasoned that the
mortgagee's bargain, made by its successful bid, was to surrender
its entire judgment for the property as encumbered, including un-
paid taxes. A court should not enhance this bargain by requiring
someone else to pay taxes voluntarily assumed by the purchasing
mortgagee. 151
2. DEFENSES
A mortgagor in Florida has a number of valid defenses availa-
ble in a foreclosure proceeding. When a mortgagee takes possession
of mortgaged property abandoned by the mortgagor, however, a
later suit by the mortgagor for misconduct by the mortgagee, such
as conversion, does not bar the mortgagee's contractual right to
foreclosure. Following this rule, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, held in Hannah v. Perego'" that the subsequent miscon-
duct of the mortgagee did not prevent acceleration of the mortgage
balance and foreclosure after the mortgagor's breach. In Hannah,
the mortgagees accelerated a mortgage and sued for foreclosure be-
cause the mortgagor had defaulted in payments and failed to pay
taxes or insurance. The mortgagor abandoned the property, a fu-
neral home, and the mortgagees took possession of it and operated
it. The mortgagor counterclaimed for the mortgagees' alleged con-
version of some of the business's property, and a jury found for the
mortgagor on this claim. Because of the success of the conversion
counterclaim, the trial court denied foreclosure, a result reversed
on appeal.
Although a defaulting mortgagor may not justifiably rely on
his mortgagee's misconduct he may assert as a valid defense an
oral agreement to limit the mortgagee's remedy upon the mortga-
gor's default. In Lauderdale North Properties, Inc. v. Seacrest
Homes, Inc.,' a mortgagor proved that it would not have pur-
150. Patron v. American Nat'l Bank, 382 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
151. Id. at 158.
152. 381 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
153. 382 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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chased the property nor given back a purchase-money note and
mortgage had the mortgagee-seller not orally agreed that its sole
remedy in case of default would be foreclosure. This remedy ex-
cluded any personal claims against the mortgagor. The court held
that parol evidence of the agreement was admissible; the mortga-
gor, however, was not entitled to attorney's fees for defending the
foreclosure action. The mortgagor was asserting his rights under
the prior oral agreement and not under the written agreement that
provided attorney's fees to the winning party.
In another case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that an alleged mortgagee's lack of proof that it was the
holder of the note was a valid defense for the mortgagor. Further,
the mere submission of a copy of the note showing a third party
bank as the payee was insufficient to allow foreclosure by the al-
leged mortgagee. 154 "
In attempting to protect borrowers from unjust accelerations
of due-on-sale clauses, Florida courts generally allow the borrowers
to assert equitable defenses. For example, one Florida court re-
cently held that a court of equity may deny foreclosure under a
"due-on-sale" clause in the absence of any demonstrated impair-
ment of the lender's security by the unauthorized sale. 156
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES
Before awarding attorney's fees in foreclosure proceedings,
Florida courts ordinarily allow the submission of testimony and
full cross-examination of witnesses for both sides. Consequently,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, recently held that a
154. International Center of the Americas, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 384 So. 2d 725 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980). The bank's failure to explain why it did not present the original note, show-
ing an indorsement to it, is quite astounding to the author. Id. at 726. See also International
Center of the Americas, Inc. v. Chemical Bank, 386 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (compan-
ion case).
155. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See
Northside Bank v. Melle, 380 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), upholding the trial court's
summary judgment against a bank mortgagee that had attempted to accelerate and fore-
close, because of the bank's unconscionable behavior and estoppel. The mortgagor appar-
ently based the estoppel defense upon the bank's long history of accepting late payments;
the decision failed to detail the alleged unconscionable acts; Padgett v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 378 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), refusing to reverse the trial court's foreclo-
sure judgment despite the legal causes of action and the mortgagors' request for a jury trial
because those issues were separately triable. But cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Peter-
son, No. TCA 79-940 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 1981) (state courts preempted from allowing equi-




trial court cannot award attorney's fees in a foreclosure suit based
solely on the lawyers' affidavits, especially over the objection of the
mortgagor. The court must permit testimony and cross-examina-
tion of the witnesses.' Similarly, the Fourth District ruled in an-
other case that a trial court cannot award attorney's fees to the
mortgagee based solely on the testimony of the mortgagee's attor-
ney, when the mortgagor's attorney has objected to this
procedure.' 7
Another appellate court considered the award of attorneys'
fees in the foreclosure of a mortgage tainted by usurious interest.158
That court held that the award must be limited to the attorneys'
work in foreclosing the mortgage for the legally enforceable portion
of the loan; the trial court thus properly refused to award fees for
efforts spent on the usurious part of the loan. Furthermore, a rea-
sonable attorney's fee awarded under a mortgage provision is
"properly limited to the reasonable (read: non-excessive) expense
actually incurred." 159 The mortgagee may recover "the amount he
must pay his lawyer, or a reasonable fee, whichever is lower."160
4. REDEMPTION
Florida law has historically favored redemption by anyone
having an interest in mortgaged property that might be lost
through foreclosure. The right to redeem belongs to the mortgagor
and those claiming under or through him. This right continues un-
til the court confirms the foreclosure sale, or, if there is no objec-
tion, until the issuance of a certificate of title.'6 ' Observing this
rule, a decision in 1980 held that a mortgagor's grantee has the
same redemption rights upon foreclosure as the mortgagor would
have had by continuing to own the property. The right may be
exercised by tendering into court the amount awarded in the fore-
closure suit before the sale's confirmation. 2
156. Geraci v. Kozloski, 377 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
157. Walker v. Kremer, 382 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
158. Trustees of Cameron-Brown Inv. Group v. Tavormina, 385 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1980).
159. Id. at 731.
160. Id. See Walker v. Senn, 376 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which upheld an
award of an attorney's fee in excess of 26% of the principal balance due on the note and
mortgage. The fee was reasonable because the attorneys had to defend a counterclaim of the
defendant-mortgagors for rescission and cancellation of the mortgage.
161. All-State Mortgage Corp. v. Strasser, 286 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1973).
162. John Stepp, Inc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 379 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980).
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5. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF SALES
The general rule in Florida is that inadequacy of sales price
alone is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a judicial sale of
foreclosed property. Only when the inadequacy is gross and results
from mistake, accident, fraud, surprise, or misconduct will equity
provide relief.163
Interpreting this rule, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that a trial court abused its discretion by vacating a
sale in which the sales price on a home worth $48,000 was only
$5,000. The court's reasons for vacating, in addition to the low
price, were the mortgagor-wife's destruction of the summons and
complaint because of an "emotional condition of unresolved anxi-
ety" 164 and her failure to notify her husband-mortgagor about the
foreclosure suit. In that case, the husband did not learn of the suit
until he received a motion for writ of assistance for possession and
a notice of hearing.
The case of Dubois v. Fried" also dealt with the validity of
notice not received by a husband-mortgagor. That case, however,
held that since the estranged husband mortgagor had not received
notice of trial because the notice had been mailed to the former
marital home and his wife had not informed him, the trial court
had abused its discretion by refusing to vacate a mortgage judg-
ment against the husband. In that case, a prior court order had
enjoined the husband from entering the home.
Another Florida court held that a guarantor of a mortgage
loan who does not assert any irregularity in a foreclosure sale and
does not raise the fairness of the price on appeal waives the issue
of lack of a hearing on the property's market value.166 There, the
guarantor-defendant did not defend the action, apparently relying
on his codefendants' defenses, and waited until after the sale to file
a formal notice of appearance.
One Florida court was apparently confused when it upheld a
163. Art v. Buchanan, 190 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1966).
164. John Crescent, Inc. v. Schwartz, 382 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See
Kaplan v. Dade Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 381 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), which upheld
the trial court's action in setting aside a foreclosure sale on the grounds of mistake when the
bidder bid on property for $150.00, the lender's representative thought that the bid figure
was $150,000.00, and the mortgage judgment was for $34,472.13. Although inadequacy of
price alone is not enough to set the sale aside, inadequacy of price coupled with surprise,
mistake, and the like, will justify setting aside the sale.
165. 378 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
166. Winfield v. Second Nat'l Bank, 381 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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foreclosure sale. 6 ' In that case, the mortgagor filed a motion to set
aside the foreclosure and the subsequent sale. The trial court re-
served ruling on the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment,
based on the need for further evidence, but entered a writ of pos-
session favoring the purchaser. The appellate court held that when
a court vacates a foreclosure judgment it must also set aside the
sale. Similarly, if the court sets aside the sale, the purchaser is not
entitled to possession. Thus, the basic issue in the case was the
validity of the final judgment, upon which all further proceedings
(such as the sale) depended. The trial court should have addressed
this issue first.
6. DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS
Generally, the granting of a deficiency judgment is the rule
more than it is the exception, unless equitable considerations lead
a court to deny the judgment. An appellate court will not disturb a
deficiency decree in a mortgage foreclosure unless it finds a clear
abuse of sound judicial discretion. 1
8
If a court reserves jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment
later, it has the right to enter it at any time, subject to Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420. That rule requires dismissal for in-
activity in a suit during a one-year period, in the absence of a
showing of good cause. The District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, interpreted the one-year rule and concluded that the trial
court had abused its discretion by dismissing a mortgagee's request
for a deficiency decree as untimely. The facts showed that the
mortgagee was embroiled in other litigation concerning the fore-
closed property while the foreclosure suit lay dormant for over a
year. The court found that the mortgagee had good cause for its
lack of activity; it had taken substantial actions to mitigate its loss
by seeking recovery from other sources and by pursuing its right to
deficiency against the mortgagors. 169
F. Miscellaneous
In one recent case, county commissioners upzoned property at
the request of the owner who intended to sell it.170 The purchaser
167. Cull v. Hurth, 384 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
168. S/D Enterprises, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 374 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979).
169. Steketee v. Ballance Homes, Inc., 376 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
170. Jones v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 382 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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agreed to secure a purchase money mortgage far exceeding the
land's value before the upzoning; the commissioners reaffirmed
their zoning action, knowing of the proposed loan. When the
lender eventually sued for foreclosure against the purchaser-mort-
gagor, the court held that the commissioners were equitably es-
topped to downzone the property later. Before this case, courts ap-
plied the doctrine of equitable estoppel in zoning cases only to
property owners. The court held that on these extraordinary facts,
the mortgagee's status as a lienor or successor in title under fore-
closure was not important, but its good faith reliance on the com-
missioners' actions was decisive.
The question of intent to create an equitable lien arose in a
case decided in 1979 in the context of an agreement not to encum-
ber certain property.1 7 1 In that case, a lender loaned money in ex-
change for an agreement by the borrowers not to encumber certain
real estate without the lender's consent. The agreement was re-
corded in the public records. The borrowers then obtained a mort-
gage on the property without the lender's consent. The appellate
court held that entry of summary judgment giving the lender pri-
ority over the mortgagee and other creditors was erroneous because
a mere description of real estate in a recorded agreement not to
encumber does not conclusively establish the intention of the par-
ties to create an equitable lien on the property. A trial court must
ascertain the intention of the parties from all the circumstances of
the loan transaction. Based on this equitable lien concept, it ap-
pears that a potential lender who finds a no-sale agreement in the
title abstract acts at the peril of a court's later determination of
the intent of the borrower and the prior lender.
The case of Ran Investment, Inc. v. Indiana Insurance Co.
172
decided that a mortgagor may sue as third party beneficiary for
breach of a mortgagee's loss-payable clause. The mortgagee-lessee
had agreed to and did obtain fire coverage at the insistence of the
lessor. Fire broke out, but the mortgagee, as loss payee, refused to
sue the insurer, who had denied payment. The court held that
even though not a named insured, the lessor could sue as a third
party beneficiary. The lessor's loss in the property, however, was
limited to the balance due on the loan at the time of the loss, plus
interest on this amount.
Three other recent cases touched on different issues of bor-
171. Manatee Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Pace, 378 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
172. 379 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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rower-lender relationships. Standby fees for loan commitments re-
ceived attention. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, de-
cided a case in which a business loan applicant deposited money
with a potential lender, who then refused to make the loan or re-
turn the deposit.1"' The court held that it was reversible error to
grant an injunction ordering the lender to deposit the money in the
court registry. It was also error to restrain the lender from remov-
ing or transferring its assets. The appellate court's rationale was
that the applicant in such a case had an adequate remedy at law
for money damages.
Another court dealt with the mortgagee's right to maintain or




held that a second mortgagee who had taken possession and man-
aged the property with the consent of one joint owner was not lia-
ble in trespass to the other owner, because the mortgagee had ade-
quately protected both owners' interests.
A further development in 1979 concerned the vicarious liabil-
ity of a mortgagee for the acts of its independent contractor in
managing abandoned property.17 5 In this case, the mortgagee en-
gaged an independent contractor to manage the property but
failed to give the mortgagor the requisite notice of its intent to
enter the premises to protect its security interest. The contractor
converted some of the mortgagor's personal property and damaged
the premises. The court held the mortgagee liable for its contrac-
tor's acts. Although the general rule is that one is not liable for the
negligent acts of an independent contractor, an exception arises
when the act authorized by contract between the principal and the
agent is itself tortious (e.g., requiring a trespass). In that event,
liability will extend to the contractor's negligent acts, authorized
by the contract, and to his unauthorized collateral acts.
G. Legislation
The Florida Legislature made some noteworthy changes in the
173. Digaeteno v. Perotti, 374 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). See First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 375 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), deciding that when a
lender agreed to issue its commitment to give a mortgage in return for a nonrefundable
commitment fee, the borrower was not entitled to a return of the fee based upon the alleged
failure of the lender to issue its formal commitment. See also Blouin v. American Liberty
Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), which implicitly held that client mortgagors
defrauded by a mortgage broker may share pro rata in a $5,000 bond posted by the broker
under former § 494.04 of the Florida Statutes (1975).
174. Wilson v. Southern Discount Co., 385 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
175. Davis v. Charter Mortgage Co., 385 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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statutes governing mortgages. Section 701.04 of the Florida Stat-
utes 1 76 now provides that it is no longer permissible to note a satis-
faction on the margin of a mortgage, notice of lien, or judgment.
Furthermore, the person satisfying a mortgage, lien, or judgment
must now send the recorded satisfaction to the paying person
within sixty days of the receipt of full payment. In a civil action
arising under this section, the prevailing party may now recover
attorney's fees and costs.
The legislature amended the usury statutes to provide that
usurious contracts shall cover a "line of credit" or "obligation'
' 77
in addition to a loan, advance of money, and the like. The statute
defines the term "line of credit" as an arrangement "under which
one or more loans or advances of money may be made available to
a debtor in one or a series of related transactions. 178 Also, the spe-
cial provisions relating to loans in excess of $500,000 now define a
loan as exceeding $500,000 in three situations: 1) if the amount
advanced initially exceeds $500,000; or 2) the aggregate principal
indebtedness of such loan "may reasonably be expected to exceed
$500,000 during the term thereof, notwithstanding the fact that
less than that amount in the aggregate is initially or at any time
thereafter advanced in one or a series of related transactions;' 7 9 or
3) "such loan [or] advance of money. . . exceeds $500,000 at any
time, notwithstanding the fact that such indebtedness is or is not
subsequently reduced to less than $500,000 and thereafter addi-
tional amounts are advanced in one or a series of related transac-
tions which in the aggregate do not exceed $500,000."180 This au-
thor predicts that the quoted language will be a marvelous source
of employment for the trial bar, given the ambiguity inherent in
this definition.
X. BANKS AND BANKING
A. Customer Suits
Several recent cases have spoken on banks' duties towards
their customers. The question of a bank's obligation to pay only
the named payee of a check, absent any negligence of the bank's
customer, arose in the case of Baxter v. Southern National
176. FLA. STAT. § 701.04 (Supp. 1980).
177. Id. § 687.02(1).
178. Id. § 687.0303.
179. Id. § 687.03(3)(b).
180. Id. § 687.03(3)(c).
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Bank. 8' In that case, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that a complaint alleging payment to the wrong payee was
sufficient to state a cause of action against the bank for breach of
contract.
At issue in another Fourth District case was whether a bank
that allowed an unauthorized person access to a safety box had
effectively disclaimed liability for losses from the box when the
contract containing the exculpatory clause also included the bank's
specific promise to preclude access of unauthorized persons to the
box. 8 ' The contract provided that "[n]o person other than the
renter or approved deputy named in the books of the Bank .. .
shall have access to the safe . . ... "' The court held the bank
liable for the depositor's loss that resulted when the bank allowed
his ex-wife to have access to the box. If the court had upheld the
exculpatory clause, the contract between the bank and the deposi-
tor would have been worthless since the depositor would have re-
ceived nothing for his fee.
184
For a bank to have a contractual duty to loan money to a cus-
tomer, there first must be a mutually binding loan contract. A case
decided in 1980 points out that preliminary negotiations are not
binding on either a bank or its customer. The parties in that case
had not yet agreed on any of the essentials of a loan, such as inter-
est rate and repayment terms. The court concluded that there was
no valid claim against the bank for breach of a loan agreement. 18
B. Interbank Disputes
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, recently consid-
ered the issue of liability among banks when a check is dishonored.
In First National Bank v. Brandon State Bank,18' a customer de-
posited a $48,000 check with a depositary bank; the bank credited
that amount to his account with no restriction on withdrawal. The
customer withdrew most of the funds. The drawee-payor bank dis-
honored the check and revoked its provisional credit, returning the
dishonored check to the Federal Reserve by midnight on the bank-
ing day following the day of receipt. But the drawee-payor bank
was unable to contact the Federal Reserve by telephone until the
181. 382 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
182. Sniffen v. Century Bank, 375 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
183. Id. at 893.
184. Id. at 893-94.
185. Baiter v. Pan Am. Bank, 383 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
186. 377 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
following morning. The trial court construed section 4-213(1)(d) of
the U.C.C.187 to require that the drawee-payor bank both revoke its
credit and return the item to the depositary bank before the mid-
night deadline. The Second District disagreed with the trial court's
interpretation of section 4-213(1)(d) and concluded that the payor
bank was not statutorily liable under that section and section 4-
302(1) of the U.C.C..138 Additionally, the court noted that the
payor bank did not send wire advice of the dishonor of the check
until the day after the midnight deadline. Since Federal Reserve
Operating Circular No. 16, requiring a dishonoring bank to give
wire advice of nonpayment of any item of $2,500 or more, does not
contain a time limit, it was a question of fact whether the delay in
sending wire advice constituted a lack of due care as defined in
section 4-103(1) of the U.C.C.5 9 The Second District thus reversed
and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Unfortu-
nately, the court brushed lightly over section 4-302(1) of the Code,
which was the real statutory fulcrum in this case. 190
C. Joint Accounts
Until recently the rule concerning the rights of a bank deposi-
tor vis-a-vis the guardian of his incompetent joint depositor was
that of Cape Coral Bank v. Kinney.191 In that case a guardian,
standing in the shoes of her incompetent ward who was a joint
owner of a savings account, had the right to withdraw funds from
the account to the detriment of the joint depositor. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, receded from its Cape Coral de-
cision in Drozinski v. Straub9 ' by holding that "except to the ex-
tent necessary to obtain funds for the incompetent's care and sup-
port, the guardian of an incompetent joint depositor may not
withdraw funds from a checking or savings account standing in the
joint names of the incompetent and another." 9 If there is no need
for the guardian to invade the account, and the incompetent dies
before the other tenant, the survivor will receive the entire ac-
187. FLA. STAT. § 674.213(1)(d) (1979).
188. Id. § 674.302(1).
189. Id. § 674.103(1).
190. Id. § 674.302(1), providing that a payor bank is liable for the amount of an item if
it retains the item beyond the midnight deadline or "does not pay or return the item or send
notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline." Id. § 674.302(I)(a).
191. 321 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
192. 383 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
193. Id. at 303.
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count. The court analyzed sections 656.33, 659.29, 665.271, 665.301,
and 744.444 of the Florida Statutes (1979) and determined that
none of them authorized the Cape Coral rule.'' In effect, this deci-
sion temporarily freezes the status quo in joint, accounts until the
death of the incompetent tenant or his restoration to competency.
This case does not resolve the question whether the competent
tenant can withdraw all the funds after the other tenant is adjudi-
cated incompetent.
D. Governmental Controls
Four recent cases resulted from challenges to or noncompli-
ance with the regulation of banks and banking. Two of these cases
dealt specifically with the constitutionality of two Florida statutes
regulating the creation of new banks. The Supreme Court of the
United States struck down one such statute, holding that section
659.141(1) of the Florida Statutes (1979) directly burdened inter-
state commerce in contravention of the commerce clause, because
it attempted to prevent out-of-state banks, bank holding compa-
nies, and trust companies from owning or controlling a Florida
business that sold investment advisory services. 195 The Court fur-
ther held that the Bank Holding Company Act of 19561'6 gives
states the power to permit that kind of activity but not the power
to enjoin it.
197
The District Court of Appeal, First District, on the other
hand, upheld the constitutionality of section 120.60(3)(a)(2) of the
Florida Statutes (1979). 198 That statute requires applicants for a
new bank to request a hearing within twenty-one days of publica-
tion of the application for their charter. The court in that case also
concluded that although it was error for the Department of Bank-
ing and Finance to include data not in the record in its final order,
the error was harmless because there was sufficient evidence in the
record to support its conclusion.
In another case concerning the establishment of branch banks,
the First District held that when the Department of Finance and
Banking complies with Florida's Administrative Code and statutes
in approving a branch, it need not explain why it rejected an addi-
194. Id. at 303-07.
195. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 2009, 2019 (1980).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1976).
197. 100 S. Ct. at 2021.
198. Peoples Bank v. Department of Banking & Fin., 378 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980).
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tional standard proposed by a protesting bank.'"
At issue in Pan American Bank v. Sullivan20 0 was whether a
debtor may use a bank's violation of a federal statute to avoid its
loan obligation. In that case, the court held that when a bank vio-
lates a statute prohibiting loans to finance the borrower's purchase
of the lending bank's stock, which the lending bank takes back as
collateral, the obligor may not use this illegality as a defense for
nonpayment.
E. Setoff and Garnishment of Deposited Funds
When a depositor has funds in his bank account, a number of
his creditors can reach those funds. Not the least among these
creditors is the bank itself. Generally, a bank has a right of setoff
against a customer's deposit for a debt due the bank, so long as
there is no express agreement to the contrary and the deposit is
neither a special one nor specifically applicable to some other pur-
pose. Two recent cases left this right to setoff untouched. In Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Trust Co., 20 1 the
court held that when a contractor deposits customer checks in its
account, the depositary bank may exercise its right of setoff
against these funds for a debt owed to the bank by the contractor.
The bank's setoff claim took priority even over a surety company
that issued a completion bond on a construction project unrelated
to the checks deposited by the contractor. The bank, despite its
knowledge that the contractor had not paid workmen and materi-
almen, had no duty to freeze the funds for the benefit of these
persons and the surety company. Similarly, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that a bank's right of setoff will also
prevail over a garnishing judgment creditor.2 2
The reach of a judgment creditor who is not competing with a
bank for a debtor's funds may not extend as far as a third party's
bank account. In one recent case a creditor attempted to garnish
the account of a third party.203 There was evidence that the debtor
and the third party had collaborated to defeat the debtor's credi-
tors. The court held that even though the evidence indicated collu-
199. Peoples Bank v. Department of Banking & Fin., 387 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA
1980).
200. 375 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
201. 373 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
202. Coyle v. Pan Am. Bank, 377 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).




sion between the third party depositor and the debtor, the judg-
ment creditor could not garnish the account unless it proved that
the funds were in fact fraudulently transferred from the garnishee-
debtor.
F. Corporate Securities Transactions
A recent case demonstrates the importance of timely transfer
of stock when a bank acts as a stock transfer agent. In Kaw Valley
State Bank v. Pan American Bank,204 a bank, acting as a stock
transfer agent, delayed transferring stock for almost three months,
and in the interim the SEC suspended trading so that the owner
was unable to sell the shares. The district court of appeal reversed
the lower court's conclusion that the bank was not negligent in de-
laying to transfer the stock. The dissenting judge would have af-
firmed because, in his view, the transfer agent's delay was not the
legal cause of the loss. The shares were negotiable, and the owner
could have transferred title by delivering them and the blank stock
power to a buyer, even though title was not transferred on the cor-
poration's books.205 Although the dissent cites section 678.313(1)(a)
of the Florida Statutes (1979), that statute seems to support the
majority's stance. It states that the transfer of a security to a pur-
chaser occurs only at the time when he or his agent acquires pos-
session of a certificated security. Since the transfer agent had pos-
session the owner could not transfer its stock.0 6
G. Legislation
There was an abundance of banking legislation in the past
year and the legislature abolished several statutes. For example,
the legislature repealed chapter 654 of the Florida Statutes, relat-
ing to savings banks, effective June 12, 1980.10" The $10,000 ceiling
limitation for credit card and overdraft financing arrangements is
no longer extant; now, any bank can make such credit extensions
without limit.208 The legislature revamped the statute dealing with
real estate loan plans, deleting the old requirement that savings
and loan associations lend only on first lien mortgages. 09 The leg-
204. 383 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 669.
206. FLA. STAT. § 678.313(1)(a) (1979).
207. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-101 (repealing FLA. STAT. ch. 654 (1979)).
208. FLA. STAT. § 658.50 (Supp. 1980) (amending id. § 663.510 and renumbering id. §
659.181 (1979)).
209. FLA. STAT. § 665.0731(4) (Supp. 1980).
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islature amended and readopted chapter 560, the Sale of Money
Orders Act, providing that fees collected under the Act need no
longer be used in the administration of the Act.
2 10
The Florida legislature has completely revamped the statute
governing industrial savings banks, savings associations, credit un-
ions, and banks. For the purposes of this survey the most signifi-
cant areas are those that affect the bank customer. Several provi-
sions will be fertile sources of litigation. An industrial savings bank
may now pay any item drawn by a customer notwithstanding his
death if presentment is made within thirty days after receipt of
notice of his death.2 " Further, if the industrial savings bank does
not receive written notice, it may pay the item at any time. The
statute may cause problems because of its inconsistent use of the
terms "notice" and "written notice. '21 2 This inconsistency means
that if a bank has constructive notice of a customer's death, it may
choose when to make payment.
Another statute provides that unless joint tenants in a savings
association have given the association written notice to the con-
trary, any tenant may, by written direction to the association, de-
lete the name of a joint tenant. There will undoubtedly be substan-
tial litigation about this provision.2 18
An amendment to section 665.062 of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides that when minors have savings accounts in savings associa-
tions, their parents or guardians do not have the power to transfer
or attach any account in the name of the minor, except in the
event of the minor's death. In that case, the signature of the parent
or guardian will be a valid discharge of the institution for any sums
not exceeding an aggregate of $2,500.21"
Recent legislation has liberalized the regulation of savings and
loan associations. State and federal savings and loan associations
may now have accounts in the names of trustees "whether or not
such account is opened for a named beneficiary or beneficiaries.
2 15
This anonymity is comparable to numbered accounts in foreign
banks.
Florida savings and loan associations may now allow deposi-
210. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-22, §§ 1-2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 560.151 (1979)).
211. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-255, § 10 (amending and renumbering FLA. STAT. § 656.36
(1979) as § 662.132).
212. Id.
213. FLA. STAT. § 665.063(1)(b)-(c) (Supp. 1980).
214. Id. § 665.062 (Supp. 1980) (renumbered from id. § 665.262 (1979)).
215. Id. § 665.063(2) (Supp. 1980) (amending, combining, and renumbering id. §§
665.271, .272, .301, and .311 as § 665.063)).
[Vol. 35:465
COMMERCIAL LAW
tors to make withdrawals or transfers in the form of negotiable or-
ders or authorizations unless negotiability is forbidden by federal
law. Although the statute does not use the term, it authorizes what
are commonly known as "negotiable orders of withdrawal" or
"NOW Accounts."" 6 The legislature placed Florida savings and
loan associations on a parity with federal associations insofar as
acceleration clauses are concerned; if federal law prohibits them,
then Florida law prohibits them also. Although the legislature ob-
viously designed the statute to deal with "due-on-sale" accelera-
tion clauses, it does not mention this topic117
Banks with safe deposit facilities now have additional protec-
tion against nonpayment of rent. The bank has a lien on the con-
tents of the box "to the extent of any rental due and owing plus
the actual reasonable costs of removing the contents from the safe-
deposit box.
21 8
The liberalizing trend in banking legislation extends to foreign
banks. Foreign banks having their principal place of business
outside of Florida may now make loans or loan commitments to
any person located in Florida, and these foreign banks may solicit
"compensating deposit balances in connection therewith."219 The
legislature probably enacted this statute in response to the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States that invalidated a
Florida statute prohibiting investment advice services by out-of-
state banks.2 2
Not all the new legislation is liberalizing or innovative. For ex-
ample, the legislature reinstated Florida's parochial post-dated
check rule. A bank is not liable for paying a post-dated check un-
less the customer furnishes the bank with written notice describing




Four cases affected consumer financing in 1979. Two of those
cases defined anew how far creditors may go to collect consumer
debts. In White v. Federal Financial Corp.,212 a Minnesota corpo-
216. Id. § 665.067 (Supp. 1980) (renumbered from id. § 665.341 (1979)).
217. Id. § 665.0731(8) (Supp. 1980).
218. Id. § 661.553(1).
219. Id. § 68.75(1)(d).
220. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
221. FLA. STAT. § 658.64 (Supp. 1980) (renumbered from id. § 658.36 (1979)).
222. 379 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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ration purchased the accounts receivable of a Florida bankrupt
and attempted to collect debts owed by consumers by harassing
them through the telephone and the mail. The corporation simu-
lated legal process in its notes and correspondence and communi-
cated notice of an alleged debt to a credit bureau without disclos-
ing that the debt was disputed. The District Court of Appeal of
Florida, Fifth District, held that the Minnesota corporation was
engaged in the collection of the debts of another within the mean-
ing of section 559.55(8)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1979) and was
subject to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction.
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held
that when collection practices are especially egregious, the
harassed debtor may maintain an action for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.2 '8 In that case, an automobile credit
company attempted to learn the address of a delinquent debtor.
To do so, the credit company telephoned the debtor's mother and
told her that his children had been injured in an automobile acci-
dent. When the debtor learned this information he spent seven
hours telephoning hospitals and police departments before he dis-
covered the information was false. The court concluded that the
debtor could sue for emotional distress without accompanying
physical symptoms because the conduct of the credit company was
"so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all bounds of decency."'224 Since some prior case law was to
the contrary, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court
of Florida.
Two other cases dealt with the claims and defenses of debtors
in Florida. In Devlin v. Aetna Finance Co., 225 the District Court of
Appeal, Fifth District, determined that under the Truth in Lend-
ing Act,"6 when a seller sues a buyer for an unpaid consumer loan,
the debtor may not assert a setoff of up to twice the amount of the
finance charges after the expiration of the one-year limitation in
the Act. The court noted that although the courts are split on this
statute of limitations problem, Congress should determine whether
to treat the finance penalty as an affirmative cause of action or as a
defense.
In the other case,"7 a consumer and the seller of a copy ma-
223. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheeha, 373 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
224. Id. at 960.
225. 379 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1976).
227. Xero Graphic Supplies Corp. v. Hertz Comm'l Leasing Corp., 386 So. 2d 299 (Fla.
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chine entered into a sales contract containing a disclaimer of all
warranties. To finance the purchase, the customer agreed to sell
the machine and lease it back from the new owner. The copy ma-
chine proved defective, and the consumer sued the original seller
and the lessor for declaratory relief to excuse performance of his
lease obligation. The lessor filed a cross-claim seeking indemnifica-
tion from the seller for breach of warranties of merchantibility. Al-
though the lease agreement did not contain a federally mandated
provision that the debtor could assert against a holder of the con-
tract all claims and defenses he would have against the seller, the
trial court read the provision into the lease agreement. The trial
court concluded that the debtor had a defense against both the
lessor and the seller because the original disclaimer in the sales
contract was ineffective; the lessor's indemnity cross-claim was
therefore permissible. The appellate court reversed, holding that
the seller had effectively disclaimed all warranties. The seller was
not liable to the buyer for breach of warranties and thus was not
liable to the lessor.
B. Legislation
The Florida legislature has reached out to protect consumers
by enacting or amending statutes on health studio services, auto-
mobile dealerships, repair shops, condominium maintenance orga-
nizations, retailers, and finance companies. For example, every
contract for the sale of health studio services must now be in writ-
ing. Additionally, every health studio that sells contracts for health
services must maintain a $25,000 bond before and for three years
after commencing business. The Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services may waive the bond requirement if the studio
can prove sufficient financial responsibility to justify waiver. Stu-
dios that have operated at the same location under the same own-
ership since July 1, 1977, need not comply with this act.
228
Florida may now deny, suspend, or revoke a motor vehicle
dealer's license if he has a history of bad credit. These sanctions
also apply if the dealer has knowledge of damage to a new car re-
quiring repairs that actually cost more than three percent of its
retail price2 2 9 and fails to disclose such knowledge to a customer.
Furthermore, the state may deny a license to dealers in mobile
3d DCA 1980).
228. FLA. STAT. § 501.012 (Supp. 1980).
229. The three percent cap does not apply to tires, bumpers, or glass.
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homes and recreational vehicles when, inter alia, "the applicant
has failed to provide warranty service.
' '
123
Beginning on January 1, 1981, motor vehicle repair shops must
give written repair estimates whenever repairs will exceed $50, un-
less the customer signs a written waiver of his right to such an
estimate. If the repair shop determines that the actual repairs will
exceed the estimate by $10 or ten percent, whichever is greater, the
repair shop must then obtain the customer's permission to make
the repairs. The repair shop must note the authorization and the
amount of money authorized on the repair form. The consumer
may, of course, cancel the contract if the actual cost of repairs will
exceed the original estimate. The statute seems unduly compli-
cated. Any mechanic who can understand and apply this statute
should lay down his tools and hang up his attorney-at-law
shingle.2 1
Section 634.401(2) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) now
provides that a "service warranty" shall not include "service con-
tracts entered into between consumers and nonprofit organizations
or cooperatives whose members consist of condominium associa-
tions and condominium owners, whose contracts require the per-
formance of repairs and maintenance for appliances or mainte-
nance of the residential property. 2 3
2
The Retail Installment Sales Act233 now requires that retail in-
stallment contracts caution the consumer to "keep [the contract]
to protect your legal rights."2'' In addition, the department may
now order a seller to refund any amounts charged on a retail in-
stallment contract that exceed the maximum charges permitted by
the act or rules of the department.35
Upon the request of an installment contract buyer, the holder
of the contract may now extend the scheduled due date of all or
part of any installment. If the time is so extended, the holder may
charge for each thirty day extension an amount not to exceed one-
twelfth of the maximum allowable rate per annum of the unpaid
balance at the time of the extension.286
In addition to the finance charges under the retail installment
230. FLA. STAT. § 320.27 (Supp. 1980).
231. Id. §§ 559.901, .902, .903, .905, .908, .909, .911, .915, .917, .919, .921, .923.
232. Id. § 634.401(2).
233. Id. §§ 520.30.42.
234. Id. §§ 520.07(2)(b), .34(l)(b).





may be charged for. . . reasonable fees and costs actually to be
paid for construction authorizations and similar permits issued
by public agencies and for title search, title insurance, and ser-
vices of an attorney relating to any real property mortgage, lien
or other encumbrance taken, granted or reserved pursuant to
the contract.2
37
The legislature amended sections 516.031(2) and (3) and
516.20(2) of the Florida Statutes to increase the limit of consumer
finance loans from $2,500.00 to $25,000.00, and to provide that on
loans in excess of $2,500.00 the simple interest on the entire princi-
pal sum shall not exceed eighteen percent per annum. The con-
sumer lender may now also charge the borrower for genuine
charges the lender incurs in paying "for title insurance or appraisal
of real property."" 8 Common sense dictates that the disjunctive
''or" is in error; the legislature must have intended the conjunctive
"and." Finally, on loans of $2,500 or less, no lender may provide
for scheduled repayment of principal for more than thirty-six
months and fifteen days from the date the loan is made. If, how-
ever, the loan is in excess of $2,500, the scheduled repayments may
exceed that time period.2 9
XII. SECURITY INTERESTS
A. Perfection
The courts did not escape definitional problems with Article 9
of the U.C.C.. In response to questions certified by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that a nonnegotiable bank certificate of deposit
prohibiting assignments without the bank's consent is an "instru-
ment" under section 679.105(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes (1979).240
The court categorized the owner's assignment of the certificate to a
lender as a secured transaction under Article 9 but stated that the
bank issuer was not an account debtor within the meaning of sec-
tion 9-105(1)(a) of the U.C.C..2 1 Since the bank was not an ac-
count debtor, section 9-318 of the U.C.C.24 2 did not invalidate the
237. Id. § 520.78(4).
238. Id. §§ 516.031(1), .031(3), .20(2).
239. Id.
240. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Bornstein, 374 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1979).
241. FLA. STAT. § 679.105(1)(a) (1979).
242. Id. § 679.318.
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
restrictions on transfer contained in the certificate. Finally, the
court held that the bank's alleged right of setoff did not arise
under section 9-318 of the U.C.C.. 23 The court implied that the
bank's right of setoff would be effective against the assignee, al-
though the Code itself excludes the setoff concept from the cover-
age of Article 9.
244
A recent case decided that a lending bank has a duty to learn
whether the president of a corporation has the authority to pledge
corporate assets for a personal loan to himself. In the absence of
approval by the corporate board of directors, the bank must return
to the corporation any corporate property pledged by the
president.2 "
B. Priorities
The question of priorities among security interests continued
to generate much litigation in Florida. The cases addressed com-
peting interests in mobile homes, inventory, equipment, and a con-
tractor's receivables. In Barnett Bank v. Rompon,2" the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, concluded that a perfected se-
curity interest in a mobile home could have priority over the inter-
est of the owner of real property. That case concerned a dispute
between a bank with a recorded security interest and an execution
lien creditor who purchased the land under the mobile home at a
sheriff's sale. The creditor claimed title to the home, arguing that
it was a fixture to the land. Although the court acknowledged that
the mobile home was indeed a fixture, it nevertheless ruled in favor
of the bank. The court reasoned that Florida law still required a
mobile home to have a license plate; therefore, the mobile home
remained subject to the motor vehicle registration laws,247 regard-
less of its annexation to the land. Since the bank had perfected its
security in the mobile home, its prior perfected security interest
prevailed over the creditor's lien.
Another case touching on title to mobile homes presented an
unusual aspect of the buyer-in-ordinary-course doctrine. In Milnes
v. General Electric Credit Corp.,248 a married couple purchased a
243. Id.
244. See id. § 679.104(1).
245. American Bus. Credit Corp. v. First State Bank, 385 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980).
246. 377 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
247. 1979 Fla. Laws chs. 79-329, 79-320.
248. 377 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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mobile home and gave back a security agreement to the seller, who
assigned it to a finance company, GEC. The seller recorded the
"lien" of the security interest on the Florida certificate of title.
When the couple could not continue their payments, they deliv-
ered the mobile home to a mobile home dealer and informed GEC
of the delivery. GEC agreed to this arrangement when the dealer
promised not to sell the mobile home without GEC's consent. The
dealer sold the mobile home to another couple, who gave back a
security agreement that the dealer assigned to another finance
company. The dealer then issued its check to GEC, but it was dis-
honored; the dealer had gone out of business. GEC brought suit
against the second purchasers and their finance company. The
court held that GEC had entrusted the mobile home to the dealer,
which dealt in goods of the kind; thus, the second purchasers, as
buyers in the ordinary course of business, took free of the recorded
security interest held by GEC.24 The court noted in dicta that if
the original purchasers had entrusted the mobile home to the sec-
ond dealer without the knowledge and consent of GEC, then the
second sale would not have cut off GEC's prior perfected security
interest. This decision is clearly correct; the lender must be an en-
trustor before a sale to a buyer in ordinary course destroys his
interest.
Another case illustrates that it is not necessary for a buyer in
ordinary course to be without knowledge of a perfected security
interest to have priority in goods purchased from a dealer. 50 In
that case, an appellate court ruled that a bank with a floor plan
security interest in a retailer's inventory could not replevy inven-
tory sold to a buyer who knew of the security interest, if the bank
had consented to the sale and required the buyer to make his in-
stallment payments to the bank itself.
A case of first impression in Florida, Gulfstar, Inc. v. Advance
Mortgage Corp.,25 1 demonstrates that a court may conclude that a
manufacturer is not negligent when it issues duplicate statements
of origin to a retailer who uses one copy to arrange financing on a
boat after selling it to a bona fide purchaser. In that case, the court
held that there was no privity of contract between the manufac-
turer and the lender. The dealer's criminal act was an intervening
cause that broke whatever chain of foreseeability might have ex-
249. See FLA. STAT. §§ 672.403(2), .403(3), 679.307(1) (1979).
250. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Haierhoffer, 382 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
251. 376 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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isted, and therefore the manufacturer was not negligent.
Another case of first impression held that priority rules of the
Florida U.C.C. supersede section 726.09 of the Florida Statutes
(1979), which provides that an unrecorded conditional sales con-
tract is valid for two years. 2  As a result, when a seller sold air
conditioning equipment to a customer on a conditional sales con-
tract and failed to file a financing statement, the equipment be-
came subject to a savings and loan association's prior perfected se-
curity interest in all the equipment owned by the customer. This
holding is correct if one assumes that the prior security interest
had an after-acquired property clause or that the description of
the property secured was broad enough to encompass the later-ac-
quired air conditioning equipment. But the case failed to mention
this issue.
The case of J.E. Joyner, Inc. v. Emlinger53 specifically ad-
dressed the effect of an after-acquired property clause on priori-
ties. The court correctly held that a purchase money lender on
equipment had priority over a prior lender's after-acquired prop-
erty interest; it incorrectly held that the prior lender's after-ac-
quired property clause would fasten on the borrower's equity in
the equipment. Additionally, the court held that the purchase
money lender, although entitled to possession of the equipment af-
ter the debtor's default, was not entitled to use the equipment
under section 9-207(4) of the U.C.C..2 54 It should have given notice
to the first lender under section 9-505(2) of the U.C.C.2 8 if it in-
tended to keep the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.
Like a purchase money lender, a surety usually occupies a pre-
ferred position vis-a-vis a prior secured lender. Under general sure-
tyship rules, a surety who both pays for a general contractor's
debts and completes his construction work is entitled to priority
over a perfected security interest in the contractor's receivables. A
recent case shows, however, that when the surety bond stipulates
that the principal must reimburse the surety for any payments
made by the surety, payments made in the absence of default by
the principal create only a contractual right to reimbursement.2
This right does not have a priority over a prior perfected security
252. Suburbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151
(Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
253. 382 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
254. FLA. STAT. § 679.207(4) (1979).
255. Id. § 679.505(2).
256. Waterhouse v. McDebitt & Street Co., 387 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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interest. The priority of a surety over earlier perfected interests is
premised on the doctrine of equitable subrogation, not contractual
subrogation.
C. Proceeds
Two cases illustrate the wide range of interpretation that a
court may give to the 1962 version of section 9-306 of the U.C.C..
The Supreme Court of Florida applied a narrow reading of section
679.306(3) of the Florida Statutes (1975) in the case of Barnett
Bank v. Applegate,57 in which a first lender neglected to check the
proceeds box in its recorded financing statement covering cattle,
and the second lender loaned on the cattle. The second lender did
claim the proceeds. The court held that the first lender had no
claim to the proceeds of the sale of the cattle over the valid claim
of the second lender. Under the 1972 version of section 9-306(3),2 8
adopted in Florida after the transaction in Barnett Bank," 9 a se-
cured lender does not have to check the proceeds box in its financ-
ing statement to claim proceeds; rather, the first lender may claim
the proceeds automatically.
The second case, Kahn v. Capital Bank,26 0 addressed the
question whether insurance proceeds from a fire loss are proceeds
of goods under the pre-1972 version of section 9-306, as well as
under the 1972 version. The District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, recognized that the case arose under the 1962 version, which
does not define casualty losses as proceeds. The court stressed
however, that the adoption of the 1972 amendment, specifically in-
cluding insurance proceeds, merely codified the existing case law in
Florida.2" The court therefore concluded that under the 1962 ver-
sion, the insurance proceeds were proceeds from the sale of goods.
D. Enforcement
Four recent cases involved the enforcement of security inter-
ests. In Alderman Interior Systems, Inc. v. First National Heller
257. 379 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The Supreme Court of Florida later quashed
the reversal of the trial court's grant of a constructive trust for the vendors of the cattle. 377
So., 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979).
258. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(3) (1979).
259. Florida adopted the 1972 version in 1979, effective on January 1, 1980.
260. 384 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
261. See Paskow v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 579 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the
court held that insurance proceeds from a fire loss or damage to personal property located in
a building subject to a security interest constituted proceeds under Florida law.
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Factors, Inc.,262 an appellate court concluded that when a seller's
assignee sues a buyer and the buyer's guarantor, the assignee can-
not recover unless he proves that the assignor of the account deliv-
ered goods to the buyer under a valid open account. The assignee
must also prove the amount of the sales price remaining unpaid on
the open account. Further, if the assignee's claim against the
debtor is defective, so is his claim against the debtor's guarantor.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, faced a rather in-
tricate problem of enforcement under a letter of credit in Chrysler
Motors Corp. v. Florida National Bank.263 In that case, Chrysler
sold motor vehicles to a dealer under a properly perfected
purchase money security interest. A bank issued a letter of credit
on behalf of the dealer. The bank then informed Chrysler that it
was terminating its letter of credit. The court held that Chrysler
had no duty to the bank to mitigate its loss by repossessing vehi-
cles from the dealer. In light of the facts of the case, it seems
strange that the parties arranged for Chrysler, rather than the
bank, to have a security interest in the dealer's inventory.
Further problems of enforcement arose in Gilmore v. State
Board of Administration, 2  a suit in the First District over a sale-
repurchase agreement between a brokerage house and its customer.
The broker had sold U.S. treasury bills and notes to the customer
and agreed to repurchase them. The brokerage house failed to re-
purchase because it went bankrupt. The buyer sold the instru-
ments at a profit. The brokerage house then sued for the profits,
alleging that the buyer had breached the repurchase agreement.
The court did not agree that the brokerage house was entitled to
any excess under sections 9-502 and 9-504 of the U.C.C.; 65 instead,
the court held that the buyer had not breached the repurchase
agreement and was not liable to the defaulting brokerage house.
Finally, in Rug Mart, Inc. v. Pellicci,266 the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, considered whether a carpet installer with
a security interest in carpeting could proceed against the home-
owner under the Florida mechanic's lien statute. The court
stressed that even though the carpet installer had viable remedies
under Article 9, he could forego those remedies and enforce his in-
terest in the installed carpet by treating the carpet as affixed to
262. 376 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
263. 382 So. 2d 32 (Fla. lst DCA 1980).
264. 382 So. 2d 861 (Fla. lst DCA 1980).
265. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.502, .504 (1979).
266. 384 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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realty and suing to foreclose under chapter 713 of the Florida
Statutes.
E. Forfeiture of Motor Vehicles
Under the aegis of sections 943.41-.44 of the Florida Statutes
(1979), the state may seize any motor vehicle allegedly used in
criminal activity. Two recent cases touched on these sections of the
statute. In Metropolitan Dade County v. Garcia,2 7 the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, concluded that section 943.44(1)
did not preclude release of a seized motor vehicle to the circuit
court, although the statute provided for release of the motor vehi-
cle only to its innocent owner or lienholder.
The second case involved the seizure of a motor vehicle used
in the transportation of drugs.2e In that case, the owner was not in
the car when it was seized. The court held that, under sections
943.41-.44, the owner does not lose his vehicle unless the state can
show that he had express or implied knowledge of its illegal use.
F. Wrongful Repossession
Three wrongful repossession cases highlight the drawbacks to
an imprudent repossession. For example, in Puzzo v. Ray,2 a
debtor sued for conversion when a creditor seized furniture and
appliances without first making certain that he and three other
creditors actually had a secured interest in the goods. The court
held that a judgment creditor could reach any damages the debtor
obtained because the debtor's conversion suit was a chose in ac-
tion, a property right subject to execution under section 56.29(5) of
the Florida Statutes (1979).
The extent of a wrongful repossessor's liability was at issue in
another case decided in 1980.10 In that case, the District Court of
Appeal, Fifth District, held that the conditional seller of goods who
had wrongfully repossessed them was liable to the buyer in conver-
sion not for the full value of the goods but only for the value of the
buyer's special interest in the goods. The special interest was the
267. 375 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
268. In're 1975 Pontiac Grand Prix, 374 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). See One
Douglas DC-3 Aircraft v. State, 376 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (abandonment, plain view,
probable cause, and exigent circumstances were sufficient grounds to justify the seizure and
forfeiture of an aircraft for the transportation of contraband, under FLA. STAT. § 943.43
(1979)).
269. 386 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
270. Page v. Matthews, 386 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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conditional buyer's payment towards principal up to the time of
the wrongful repossession.
7 1
The District Court of Appeal, First District, also considered
the issue of damages for wrongful repossession in Elgin Federal
Credit Union v. Curfman.27' In Elgin, a finance company wrong-
fully repossessed the owner's car. The jury subsequently found a
wrongful conversion and awarded punitive damages unsupported
by a compensatory award. The First District held that the mere
establishment of liability for conversion was sufficient to support
punitive damages.
G. Execution
The question of who may levy on what property continued to
generate litigation in Florida. In a case of first impression, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fifth District, expanded the scope of execu-
tion by permitting levy on stock in a nonprofit corporation under
section 56.061 of the Florida Statutes (1979). 8
In Salina Manufacturing Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 4 an ap-
pellate court had to decide which of two judgment creditors should
reach the debtor's assets. One creditor, Diner's Club, obtained a
writ of execution but was unable to collect any portion of its judg-
ment because it could not discover any assets subject to execution.
The other creditor, Salina Manufacturing Co., after extensive in-
vestigation over a number of years, learned that the debtor and his
wife had purchased a boat. Because the debtor and his wife owned
the boat as tenants by the entirety, the sheriff could not levy on it.
Salina then initiated supplementary proceedings to subject the
boat to levy under section 56.29 of the Florida Statutes (1979). The
county court granted the requested relief and ordered the sheriff to
levy on the boat and sell it to satisfy Salina's judgment. Even
though Salina was not the initial creditor, the appellate court held
that Salina had priority over Diner's Club because, of the two
creditors, Salina was the more diligent in discovering the debtor's
assets.
H. Legislation
Numerous changes to the Florida Statutes in 1980 affected Ar-
271. Id. at 817.
272. 386 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
273. Icardi v. Nat'l Equip. Rental, 378 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
274. 382 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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ticle 9. For example, the legislature made farm filings even more
complicated by amending sections 9-401(1)(a) and (d):
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security
interest is as follows:
(a) If the collateral is equipment used in farming opera-
tions, or farm products, or accounts, or general intangibles aris-
ing from or relating to the sale of farm products by a farmer, by
recording:
1. In the office of the clerk of the circuit court in the county
of debtor's place of business if he has one, in the county of his
chief executive office if he has more than one place of business,
otherwise in the county of his residence; or
2. If the debtor is not a resident of this state, in the office of
the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the [foregoing]
collateral is located; and
3. In addition, if the collateral is crops, in the office of the
clerk of the circuit court in the county where the land is located
on which the crops are growing or to be grown.
(6) A financing statement or continuation statement filed on
collateral described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) which is
perfected only by filing with the Department of State during the
period January 1, 1980, until May 20, 1980, shall be effective as
provided in s. 679.403; except that the financing statement or
continuation statement may be continued upon expiration by
filing a new financing statement conforming to s. 680.109(4) in
the office described in paragraph (a) of subsection (1).275
Under the newly amended Motor Vehicle Repair Act, chapter
559 of the Florida Statutes,' 7 " a motor vehicle repair shop that in-
tends to sell a motor vehicle to satisfy repair costs must notify the
owner and lien holders by registered or certified mail at least forty-
five days before the proposed sale. After the shop completes the
repairs, it must wait at least sixty days before conducting a sale.
The lien holder may then contest the right of the motor vehicle
repair shop to possess and sell the vehicle, by filing his claim with
the clerk of the circuit court. The secured party may demand a
hearing, which the court must hold before the sale. The court will
then determine the rights of the parties and may award attorney's
fees and costs to the prevailing party. If the court determines that
the motor vehicle repair shop has the right to sell the vehicle, the
275. FLA. STAT. § 679.401 (Supp. 1980) (the bracketed word appeared in 1980 Fla. Laws
ch. 80-29, § 1).
276. See note 231 supra.
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shop may sell it at public or private sale. In the case of a private
sale, every aspect of the sale, including the method, manner, time,
place, and terms must be commercially reasonable. The repair
shop may then deduct the amounts of its charges (repair, storage,
and sales expenses) from the proceeds of the sale, and deposit the
remainder, if any, with the clerk of the circuit court. Under court
order, the clerk pays the surplus to the secured party and to the
owner of the vehicle. The certificate of compliance by the clerk of
the circuit court constitutes sufficient proof (of compliance) for an
application to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehi-
cles for a transfer of title. When a repair shop complies with this
statute and sells a vehicle to a purchaser for value, the purchaser
takes title free and clear of all claims. Although the statute does
not specify that the buyer must be in good faith, the courts should
hold that this requirement is implicit in the concept of a commer-
cially reasonable sale.
The legislature changed the name of the statutes dealing with
state seizure of motor vehicles from the "Florida Uniform Contra-
band Transportation Act" to the "Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act.'277 The legislature also placed a more stringent burden of
proof on the owner of a seized vehicle to show that he is entitled to
release of his vehicle. Under amended section 943.43, an owner
must show that he did not know or have reason to know "after a
reasonable inquiry"'' 6 that someone used his vehicle improperly.
Subsequent interpretation of this wording remains a matter of
some doubt.
I. Duties of Secured Lenders
Four recent Florida cases dealt with the varying duties of se-
cured parties. In Pan American Bank v. Osgood,'79 an obligee on a
note and security agreement allegedly telephoned the bank's loan
officer to obtain pay-off figures. The obligee then sent in a check
for the amount allegedly owed. Months later, the bank informed a
credit bureau that the obligee's credit rating was bad because he
had not paid the entire balance due on his obligation. The obligee
then sued the bank and recovered compensatory and punitive
damages for negligent injury to his credit reputation. A majority of
277. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-68, §§ 1-13 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41, .43, .44, .205(1),
.206, 562.27(6), .35, 849.36(1), 893.12(2), 705.01(2), .19(1), 790.08(6), and adding § 943.42(4)
(1979)).
278. Id. § 2.
279. 383 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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the appellate court affirmed, apparently concluding that the bank
had a duty to give accurate pay-off information, to attempt to col-
lect the alleged balance of the loan, or to notify the obligee of the
report sent to the credit bureau. The majority seemed to agree
with the trial court that the original loan was fully paid with the
obligee's check for less than the amount owed. The court relied on
section 3-408 of the U.C.C.,110 which states that "no consideration
is necessary for an instrument or obligation . . . given in payment
• ..for an antecedent obligation of any kind."2 81 This author sub-
mits that section 3-408 had no application to the transaction in the
case. If the court was focusing on the concept of accord and satis-
faction, it should have researched its own prior decisions for the
proper authority. The dissent noted that the obligee was unable to
cite any case law or statutory authority 2 " that created any duty for
the bank to give notice of the outstanding loan balance, collect the
alleged balance of the loan, or to notify the obligee that it would
give loan status information to a credit bureau. The dissent con-
cluded that the trial court should have directed a verdict against
the obligee, noting that if the case had been properly tried as a
libel action instead of a negligence action, the bank could have as-
serted the defense of a qualified privilege for the statements made
to the credit bureau.
A bank unsuccessfully contended that erroneous statements
made about a customer's credit were absolutely privileged in an-
other case decided in 1980.88 In that case, the bank official made
the erroneous statements during earlier litigation commenced by
the bank against the customer for an unpaid account. The court
had dismissed that proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, ruled that the statements com-
plained of were made in connection with a nonjudicial proceeding
and therefore were not absolutely privileged.
The case of Midlantic National Bank v. Commonwealth Gen-
eral Ltd.284 examined the extent of a bank's duty in lending money
under the somewhat nebulous term "line of credit." The court in
that case concluded that the term does not imply that the lender
has a duty to loan up to the amount stated nor that the borrower
280. FLA. STAT. § 673.408 (1979).
281. Id.
282. The obligee relied on 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1976), the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which had no bearing on the case.
283. Kent v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 386 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
284. 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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has a concomitant duty to borrow up to the limit. Also, if the
lender learns of derogatory information about the borrower, it need
not "fund the entire line of credit.
2 8 5
A bank's duty to use reasonable care in the preservation of
collateral was an issue in Tepper v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A.'8 In that case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that under section 9-207 of the U.C.C.287 the pledgee bank
was not responsible for a decline in the value of stock pledged as
collateral when the debtor did not request the sale of the stock.
The bank had the discretion "but not the obligation to sell the
stock."
28 8
J. Mechanics' Liens: Due Process Considerations
Section 713.76 of the Florida Statutes (1979) provides that
when a provider of services claims a lien on personal property for
labor and services and has possession of the property, the lienee
may secure the release of the property by posting a cash or surety
bond for the amount claimed. The Supreme Court of Florida held
that this statute does not deprive a lienor of his property without
due process, because even though he loses possession of the prop-
erty, he has available a liquid fund with which to pay the amount
of his claim.'8 9 The court interpreted the statute as striking a con-
stitutional balance between the interests of a property owner in
the use and possession of his property and the interests of a la-
borer in securing collateral equal in value to his services.9 0
285. Id. at 33.
286. 376 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
287. FLA. STAT. § 679.207 (1979).
288. 376 So. 2d at 36.
289. State v. Miller, 373 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1979).
290. Id. at 681.
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